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Abstract 
Scholarship on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is severely 
limited due to the secretive nature of Kim Jong Il and his regime; much of this 
secrecy and, generally, the closed nature of North Korean society is due in part to 
an ideology based on self-reliance, Juche. Through a communication scholarship 
based rhetorical examination this thesis aims to understand and explain how Kim 
Il Sung and Kim Jong Il have been able to create and sustain the Juche ideology 
in spite of North Korea’s poor economic and social condition. The research traces 
the evolution of North Korea’s Juche ideology from 1955 to 1990, using Ernest 
Bormann’s Fantasy Theme Analysis, by examining two key speeches. The first 
speech was given by Kim Il Sung and has been pinpointed by scholars as the 
symbolic inception of Juche. The second speech is thematically similar and was 
given by Kim Jong Il in 1990. The two orations are compared and the ideological 
differences between the two are parsed out and summarized. This thesis found 
that the Juche idea began as a legitimate lifestyle rhetorical vision cast to the 
people by Kim Il Sung which met the needs of the people. The purpose of the 
original Juche idea proved effective at overcoming the conditions present in 1955 
and was adopted by the nation as a whole. However, under Kim Jong Il the 
nature of Juche changed from serving to the people to serving the Korean 
Worker’s Party. The implications extend to the North Korean situation today and 
this thesis suggests a new paradigm for understanding North Korea’s possession 
of nuclear and biological weapons, hostility towards South Korea, and general 
attitude towards outsiders.  
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I. Introduction 
The Purpose 
 Jim Carrey, in the film The Truman Show, plays Truman, a man raised 
from birth in an artificial and controlled environment: a television set designed 
for him to perceive as reality. As the movie progresses one is able to see the 
process of creation and simulation beginning with a camera dangling above his 
crib along with his mobile, leading all the way to his final condition – in which his 
wife and best friend are an actress and actor respectively, simply playing a role. 
Or rather, living a role. Of course, since Truman’s life is broadcast globally on live 
television “Save Truman” activist groups begin to form, in order to release 
Truman from his enslaved state. And, of course, the protagonist is cast as the 
television producer commandeering the role of God in Truman’s life.  
 Similar in many aspects to The Truman Show, more than 20 million North 
Koreans also live in a controlled environment. Unfortunately, it is not artificial, 
nor can we simply turn it off and forget about it after 90 minutes of 
entertainment – as we can with Jim Carrey’s film. There are several striking 
similarities between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and The Truman 
Show. For example, Kim Jong Il – the current dictator/deity who exerts iron 
handed control of North Korea plays the role of protagonist and is also, in many 
respects, commandeering the role of God in the subjugation of the Democratic 
Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK). This is manifested in his control over the 
ability of North Koreans to travel domestically, the work each citizen does, and 
the education each citizen is either commanded to, or not to, receive. In many 
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ways, due to extreme use of propaganda and information control, the culture of 
the North Korean people is one invented by Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and their 
advisors.  
 Glaring dissimilarities also exist between the DPRK and The Truman 
Show. First, there are no metaphorical cameras hung over cribs, nor is North 
Korea contained inside a massive television studio in Los Angeles that dwarfs the 
famous HOLLYWOOD hillside letters as in The Truman Show. Rather, North 
Korea is the most closed and secretive nation on earth, with very little known 
about any aspect of the nation. What the outside world knows about North Korea 
has been gleaned from refugees’ personal recollections, rare and highly 
supervised journalistic forays, and first hand accounts of tourists3 who have gone 
on North Korea’s sanctioned tours of Pyongyang.  
 Second, Truman escapes his prison and, in his escape, is let go by the 
director-god of his life. North Korea, as a nation has not escaped; further, their 
dictator-god will not permit them to escape. This thesis aims to illuminate further 
the idea of Juche and the powerful grip it has on North Korea. Specifically, the 
communication of the Juche idea, by Kim Il Sung and then Kim Jong Il, will be 
analyzed using Fantasy Theme Analysis. While true change in North Korea is 
unlikely to come anywhere but from within, I hope that this piece of scholarship 
can act as an activist group to “Save North Korea,” similar to those that rallied 
around Truman and yearned for his freedom. 
                                                
3 North Korea’s tourism industry is meager. According to Mr. Walter L. Keats, founder and 
president of Asia Pacific Travel Ltd., speculates that fewer than 500 American tourists visit North 
Korea annually. In contrast, 1.7 million Americans visited China in 2007. Asia Pacific Travel Ltd., 
based in Wilmette, IL is the only tour operator licensed by North Korea to bring American tourists 
to North Korea, and then only for 5 days at a time within a 9 week annual window which 
fluctuates from year to year. Mr. Keats has been to North Korea 6 times over 13 years.  
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Justification 
 Juche is a little known tenet4 that governs 22 million persons on the 
northern half of the Korean peninsula. As will be demonstrated in this thesis, it 
governs the entirety of life in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, literally 
impacting every aspect of every North Korean citizen’s existence, constituting 
what communication scholar Ernest G. Bormann calls a “lifestyle rhetorical 
vision.” The following description, from the preface of Juche: In Our Revolution 
(1977), is an apt introduction to the tenet of Juche: 
As formulated and developed by President Kim Il Sung, the 
concept of Juche is one of the DPRK’s major contributions to world 
revolution.  
The Juche idea means, in essence, that the masters of the 
revolution and the work of construction are the masses of the 
people and that they are also the motive forces of the revolution and 
the work of construction. In other words, one is responsible for 
shaping one’s destiny.  
President Kim Il Sung has said: 
“The Juche idea is based on a philosophical theory that man 
is master of everything and decides everything.”  
On the basis of this theory, the DPRK has developed from an 
oppressed semifeudal country into a modern socialist society, 
completely rebuilding in the process from the destruction wrought 
by U.S. imperialism during the Korean War.  
                                                
4 That is, outside of Korean scholarship and South Korean popular culture. 
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Among modern revolutionary leaders in the world today, 
President Kim Il Sung – who has led the Korean people to national 
independence, the building of a modern socialist state and to the 
front lines of the worldwide struggle against imperialism - is among 
the most profound thinkers and prolific writers. (vii, viii) 
 This thesis is a study of Juche through a communication studies 
framework. Specifically, this thesis describes the evolution of Juche from a 
seemingly legitimate lifestyle rhetorical vision to a constructed reality necessary 
for the current power-holding organization in the DPRK, the Korean Worker’s 
Party, to maintain their hold on the nation. The methodology used to perform 
text-in-context analyses on two key speeches is the rhetorical tool of Fantasy 
Theme Analysis (FTA). The first speech analyzed is a 1955 speech given by 
dictator Kim Il Sung; scholars see this speech as the symbolic inception of the 
Juche idea in the DPRK. The second speech was given in 1990 by Kim Jong Il, 
Kim Il Sung’s son, protégé, and the current dictator5.  
Specifically, since FTA is an effective tool for explaining social movements 
this project will use FTA to expose the injustice inherent in the Juche idea by 
extrapolating the true nature of Juche through an analysis of Kim Il Sung’s 1955 
Speech, “On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Juche in 
Ideological Work,” and Kim Jong Il’s 1990 speech “Let Us Prepare the Young 
People as Thoroughly Reliable Successors to the Revolutionary Cause of Juche,” 
it will then compare the two speeches in order to further understand this social 
                                                
5 Detail on the choosing of these speeches is outlined in Chapter 3, Methodology.  
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movement. The goal of this thesis is to assist in illuminating an obscure political 
doctrine hereunto overlooked by communication scholars.  
Significance of the Study 
 The author of Proverbs urges, “Speak up for those who cannot speak for 
themselves, for the rights of all who are destitute” (31:8 NIV). This project will in 
many ways fit that calling. The people of North Korea cannot speak for 
themselves domestically or internationally. They have known only totalitarian 
propaganda for the last four decades. Information control is ubiquitous in the 
DPRK: “A loudspeaker is installed in every home,” writes Iyer (“In the Land”). 
With the information control present in North Korea, as well as the miserable 
conditions ranging from concentration camps to government involvement in 
global narcotics rings it is appropriate to espouse to the academic community, 
and perhaps to some degree the general population, a basic understanding of 
Juche as seen through the framework of FTA. 
Additionally, Juche has been categorized as an ersatz religion (Hale 283) 
and a rudimentary theocracy (Park 254) and Alan Kang writes that Juche is 
currently “a religious cult like-following under Kim Il Sung’s son, Kim Jong Il” 
(43).  
As Kim Jong Il puts it: 
Man alone in the world lives and conducts activity in social 
relationship. He maintains his existence and achieves his aim only 
socially [. . .] Jajuseong6 is the life and soul of man, the social being. 
                                                
6 Jajuseong is a term Kim Jong Il uses to mean “independence” and “autonomy.” 
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When jajuseong is referred to as man’s life and soul, it means social 
and political integrity. Man has a physical life and also social and 
political integrity. The physical life is what keeps a man alive as a 
biological organism; social and political integrity is what keeps him 
alive as social being. (Hale 302) 
 Hale continues by observing that although Kim denied the existence of 
God, “therefore denying that Juche was a religion,” the religious qualities 
contained in Juche “advance the idea of an immortal and sociopolitical life [. . .] 
that would conveniently provide a theological basis for the deification of Kim Il 
Sung after the Great Leader’s Death” (302). 
 It should be noted that three years following the death of the Great Leader, 
in 1998, the constitution was amended and the preamble was rewritten to say 
North Korea is a:  
Socialist fatherland of Juche which embodies the idea of and 
guidance by the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung [. . .] who 
regarded “believing in the people as in heaven” as his motto, was 
always with the people, devoted his life to them, took care of and 
guided them with a noble politics of benevolence, and turned the 
whole society into one big and united family.” (Hale 303) 
The author continues to note that this preamble to the constitution 
attributes qualities to Kim Il Sung “that Christians and Muslims usually reserve 
for Jesus and Mohammed” (Hale 303). The further illumination of this de facto 
theocracy will further global understanding of the Juche ideology. 
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By the nature of North Korea, as an extremely closed society I have had to, 
become familiar with original straight-from-North-Korea manuscripts, 
documents, and teachings. The immersion in primary source analysis, I believe, 
increases the academic strength of the thesis. Additionally, the need to find 
secondary sources to supplement my necessary primary resources forced 
creativity. Research from documentaries and interviews, as well as relying on a 
multitude of media was necessary. Specifically, to find supporting evidence of the 
fantasy of Juche chaining out, per the operational guidelines of performing a 
FTA, I observed video of North Korea’s annual Mass Games held in honor of Kim 
Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, resorted to memoirs of, and dinners with, refugees 
familiar with the national sentiment in the “Hermit Kingdom,” as well as other 
sources.   
Now, the idea itself does not justify study. But its historical and current 
impact on the millions of people who have lived with it as the center of their 
worldview for more than 40 years demands further study (Gills 108). The 
implementation and enacting of the Juche ideology has led to the deaths of at 
least hundreds of thousands and the imprisonment of millions based on political 
dissent alone (“Children of The Secret State”). The shocking atrocities in North 
Korea are enough to fill several volumes.  
Additionally, the human rights violations alone make this a country worth 
studying. As does the Cult of Personality flourishing there, manifested in the 
nation-wide state-endorsed Juche idea described as “a religious, cult-like 
following.” Or, as Kim Jong Il puts it, “The chuche [or juche] idea indicated [. . .] 
true human life [. . .] can only be realized admirably in a socialist society based on 
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collectivism. In this society, people are free from all manner of exploitation and 
oppression, domination and subordination and can lead an independent and 
creative life” (Kang, Alan, 43). 
Contrary to the above quote North Korea has been suffering continuously 
since 1991. Hardly a year has gone by which has not been marked by natural 
disaster and an economy on the brink of utter collapse. One of the functions of 
the modern iteration of Juche is to create a reality that blames American 
imperialism on the suffering economy of North Korea.7 
Finally, it seems that a critique of the Juche idea through an established 
framework such as FTA could be an invaluable building block for future Western 
and Eastern scholarship. In many ways it will be following in the footsteps of 
other scholars, who have forged ahead in writing about North Korea from a socio-
economic or geo-political perspective.  
 
                                                
7 One of the functions of FTA is to create in an individual (or group of individuals) a sense of 
identity and meaning that averts the pressures of social and natural disasters (Bormann, “Fantasy 
and Rhetorical Vision: The Rhetorical Criticism of Social Reality” 400). 
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II. Literature Review 
 Juche: An Introduction and Literature Review 
  The basic premise of this thesis is an analysis of an idea; the idea in 
question is in many facets entirely unique in the history of the world. The 
historical and current implementation of this idea is broad enough to encompass 
every aspect of a person’s life, yet concise enough to summarize in just a few 
sentences. It is an idea created from one man’s consciousness, yet adopted by, an 
entire nation-state (Gills 113). It is an idea with benefits and flaws that has been 
the root of both good days, pragmatically speaking, and some of the most 
horrendous days on earth for the 20 million plus citizens of North Korea.  
 In 2002 President Bush announced that the DPRK is one third of the triad 
of the “axis of evil.” More recently, Kim Jong Il made the news by developing and, 
in 2006, testing nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles. 
 Kim Jong Il is the protégé and son of Kim Il Sung, the first, and “eternal,” 
president of North Korea and a long time de facto fascist dictator (Hale 283). Kim 
Il Sung’s primary contribution to North Korea was the Juche idea, which can be 
thought of as an oeuvre (Chung 283; Gills 107). That is, the Juche idea is a 
complete work, including extensive writing and theorizing on how to apply it to 
heavy industry, agriculture, the national economy on a macro scale, military 
planning, and virtually any other aspect of Marxism-Leninism-based socialism 
one could fathom (Johnson). 
 Juche as an ideology simply represents the idea that the North Korean 
people are united with a strong national identity, live in complete socialistic 
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harmony with each other in a literal utopia, and, most importantly, are, as a 
nation, an isolated, self-supporting, indigenous community (Alan Kang 43). 
Juche is most commonly explained as being a form of socialist self-reliance, and 
sometimes as an exotic strain of Marxism-Leninism (Bartholet and Lui; Glain). 
Plainly, North Korea desires to be a metaphorical island – isolated from the rest 
of the world.  
 Historically Juche started out well. It was borne out of two conditions 
present at the conclusion of the Korean War. The first condition was the desire 
for the Korean people to have a united country (Gills 108). Prior to the collapse of 
Japan in 1945 the Korean peninsula had been brutally occupied by the Japanese 
(Kang 42). Upon liberation from Japan at the conclusion of WWII, the Northern 
part of the Korean peninsula was occupied by the Soviets, and the South by the 
United States, similar to the division of Germany, whose post-war division was 
occurring at the same time (Gills 107-108). Following Japanese colonization and 
then the arbitrary division of the Korean peninsula by the allies after WWII, the 
Korean people had a strong desire to reunite as a nation, which they hadn’t 
experienced since 1910 (Alan Kang 42). 
Secondly, the devastation of the North Korean infrastructure caused by the 
United States and the United Nations during the Korean War left North Korea in 
economic ruin. The Juche idea, partially based on Marxism-Leninism’s socialist 
ideals of equality, appealed to a war-torn nation, as did the emphasis on 
rebuilding heavy industry and agriculture for the purpose of complete national 
indigenous self-reliance (Gills 111). According to a reprinted article from Time 
magazine in 1951 the Allied retreat during the Korean War is to blame for much 
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of the destruction: “The planned Allied retreat began. Once more, the bumper-to-
bumper vehicle columns rolled south. It was a scorched earth retreat8: the troops 
and the aircraft burned every building in which the pursuing foe could take 
shelter” (“Scorched”).  
By 1956 Juche had been adopted by the masses (Gills 113). Through the 
1960s it was showing itself effective at bringing North Korea out of economic 
ruin. Through the 1960s North Korea was the most industrialized nation in Asia 
(Gills 115). However, the 1970s-1980s were difficult and led to increased 
subsidies from China and particularly the U.S.S.R.. Then, in 1991, disaster struck. 
The U.S.S.R. dissolved and with it went 50 percent of North Korea’s GDP, which 
was coming from Soviet subsidies (Iyer, “Juche State”). 
From 1991 to the present an estimated 500,000 (western estimations) or 
4.4 million (refugees’ estimations) North Koreans starved to death, most in the 
early to mid-1990s from famine brought on by natural disasters and “a totally 
inefficient and inept bureaucratic management” of the government-controlled 
agriculture sector (Sungoo Kim 37 “Children;” “Welcome”). In 1997 Newsweek 
reported, “Many of its 23 million people are on the brink of famine, reduced to 
rations of just 3.5 ounces of grain per day,” which is the equivalent of 1/3 of a 
U.S.-sized common kitchen measuring cup (Bartholet and Lui). Today hundreds 
of thousands (more than 2,000,000 by some accounts) political prisoners, and 
                                                
8 The result of the United Nation’s “scorched earth” policy and the war in general is summarized 
by Bradley K. Martin in Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim 
Dynasty, “In this war approximately 3.5 million Koreans had died – 2.5 million of them 
Northerners, representing a quarter of the DPRK’s prewar population. Perhaps a million Chinese 
had died. The UN death toll including battle-related deaths of 33,629 Americans plus 3,194 others 
– Turks, Greeks, French, British, Canadians, Thais, Colombians and so on – pales beside the 
Korean and Chinese numbers.”  
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their families, are in concentration camps and political prisons (“Children”). The 
current economy has literally ground to a halt and U.S. Congress estimates that 
the government of North Korea makes about $1 billion a year on the production 
and global sales of heroin and other narcotics (Central). As The Economist noted 
in 2003, “Kim Jong Il and his elites get by economically using the country’s 
shadowy trade in everything from missile technology to fake banknotes and 
narcotics” (“Desperate”). According to refugee accounts the government directs 
which crops are to be grown. Farmers are commonly instructed to grow opium 
poppies for the production of heroin to be exported on the international black 
market (“Children”). 
The Juche idea states that the head of state, currently Kim Jong Il, should 
lead the people to utopian perfection of the Juche idea (“Welcome”). The current 
execution of this axiom gives Kim Jong Il, and gave his father before him, 
complete authoritarian control over a landmass the size of Mississippi with a 
population the size of Texas (Central).  
This power is maintained primarily through information control. North 
Korean radios are not tunable; they have a switch: listeners may choose one 
government broadcast station or the other. The country is devoid of Internet 
access and the Korean Central News Agency – the official organ of the state – is 
extremely effective at controlling all media; essentially they function as a very 
large and powerful nationwide propaganda machine (“Children”). Even cell 
phones are banned in the DPRK.  
Repression and depression are clear from examples taken from this quote 
from The Economist in 2003: “Two West Europeans, visiting as guests of the 
Warner  13 
government, were taken recently to a hospital south of Pyongyang; it turned out 
to be the only one, in an area serving 1.6m people, that was equipped to handle 
major operations. Officials accompanying the visitors became ‘very, very nervous’ 
when hospital staff let slip that their two ambulances were no longer useable” 
(“Desperate”). 
Most publications, books, and articles look at North Korea from a socio-
economic or geo-political perspective. One of the most comprehensive articles 
written on Juche was published in The Review of International Affairs, “The Lens 
of Juche: Understanding the Reality of North Korean Policymakers,” which 
interprets the worldview of North Korean elites as seen through the looking glass 
of Juche (Alan Kang). The purpose is to enlighten American policy makers to the 
framework in which North Korean elites view the current nuclear crisis. This 
article is typical and representative of virtually all articles that make mention of 
Juche, most dealing with economics, Korean reunification, or the nuclear 
program of the DPRK. Within communication scholarship most articles deal with 
the western media’s framing of North Korea, Korean reunification/unity, and 
journalistic freedoms.  
In order to fully understand Juche, the reader must have an overview of 
two other forms of communism, which emerged around the same time. Marxism-
Leninism is the bedrock of Juche and from its inception Maoism and Stalinism 
heavily influenced its creation and direction. Stalin himself installed Kim Il Sung 
as the first Premier of the newly formed Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 
1948.  
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In Russia the October Revolution, which is said to be the seminal 
revolution of world communism, took place in 1917. This revolution was led by 
Lenin himself (Shub i). Albert Marrin writes: “Lenin established a pattern for 
Communist revolutions. First, he used force and terror to take control of the 
government. Then, he ruled as a dictator, banning all other political parties and 
all anti-Communist speeches and publications” (World Book). Both Stalin and 
Lenin were believers in “World Communism,” that is, a communism that is 
appropriate for all nations. According to Lenin’s vision “World Communism” 
would, eventually, come to rule all nations of the world. This idea of World 
Communism led Stalin to view global conquest as a goal of all communist states, 
leading to the Cold War.  
Prior to Lenin’s death he appointed Stalin to rule the newly formed 
U.S.S.R., which he did until his death in 1953: 
Even after Stalin's death, many Communist governments continued 
to use his style of rule, which became known as Stalinism. Stalinist 
governments eliminate all opposition by employing terrorism - that 
is, by threatening or using violence to create widespread fear. These 
governments maintain total control of the media for propaganda 
and force economic production without considering market 
conditions or the needs of workers. (World Book) 
 China celebrates its most important national holiday, its Independence 
Day, annually on October 1. It was on this day in 1949 that the Communists, led 
by Mao Zedong, declared victory in the civil war against the Chinese Nationalists 
who were driven in exile to the island of Taiwan. This also paved the way to the 
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Cultural Revolution. This particular revolution was driven by fundamental 
application of Marxism-Leninism and adhered to ideology over pragmatic politics 
and national policy. The axiom of this ideology is a classless society.  Second to 
this fundamental axiom was World Communism, in the “Little Red Book,” the 
official Cultural Revolution handbook, officially titled Quotations from Chairman 
Mao Tse-Tung, the second page opens with, “WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, 
UNITE!”  
 In addition to the focus on World Communism, violence has been, 
intentionally, a key tenet of the spread of communism; no communist revolution 
can be discussed without the communist axiom of bloodshed. This is evident in 
Mao’s quote: “Every communist must grasp the truth ‘Political power grows out 
of the barrel of a gun’” (Quotations 121).  
All three communist ideals were reactionary in nature, that is, they 
primarily came to power on the basis of appeal to the masses perceived needs, as 
left unfulfilled by other groups. For example, Karl Marx formed the first seedlings 
of communism, in reaction to the industrial revolution and the emergence of 
capitalism in France and Great Britain. Communism has never been a new 
phenomenon, rather, it has cast itself as an antithesis to the status quo by 
promising what the proletariat need, and want. In the October Revolution the 
catchphrase used by the Bolsheviks was “Bread, peace, land” (World Book). The 
promise of bread, peace, and land was a attractive proposition to a country in an 
intense food and electricity shortage, still embattled with Germany in WWI, and 
just beginning to emerge out of a period of governance through autocracy and de 
facto feudalism (Shub 89-90; World Book).  
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The Cultural Revolution was a reaction to overbearing landlords who 
mistreated peasants, during this revolution between 200,000 and several million 
landlords were executed, and their land redistributed. Like the October 
Revolution, Mao Zedong’s coming to power was during a time of war (civil war 
with the Chinese Nationalists9 which followed WWII) and in an era, which China 
could be described as being under autocratic rule and also in a state of feudalism 
(World Book). 
Juche shares several similarities with these two revolutions; it was also 
born out of a need for the citizens to reclaim their identity after the dictatorship-
type governance of Japan from 1910 to 1945 and emerge out of a disadvantaged 
feudalistic economic situation. Similar to the emergence of communism in China, 
there was a civil war immediately following WWII, the Korean War, which led to 
two separate governments and nations: South Korea and North Korea, similar in 
some regards to the People’s Republic of China and the de facto democracy 
governing Taiwan.  
More important than the similarities between Juche and North Korean 
style communism and other forms of Marxism-Leninism, though, are the 
differences. As mentioned above, the conditions in North Korea following the 
Japanese attempted colonization of Korea, WWII, and the Korean War made the 
people ready for unity. Kim Il Sung envisioned this unity in a new way, in some 
aspects it is an antonym to Lenin’s idea of “World Communism” which imagined 
communism sweeping the globe and becoming a global political-utopian reality. 
                                                
9 The Chinese Nationalist Party fled to the island of Taiwan after their defeat in Mainland China, 
where they established a de facto democracy and strong economy, both of which are still in 
existence today.  
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It is also markedly different from Mao’s hard-line commitment to the 
fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism that espouse a classless society as 
preeminent.  
Kim Il Sung envisioned independence as tantamount, and contrary to 
Lenin’s fear of nationalism, Kim embraced nationalism. Self-reliance and 
national autonomy are the primary indicators that set Juche apart from other 
brands of Marxism-Leninism.  
Fantasy Theme Analysis: An Introduction 
The theory I plan to utilize to understand and analyze Juche – briefly 
introduced above - is Fantasy Theme Analysis (FTA). It is, in fact, an application 
of Symbolic Convergence Theory (SCT). This theory elucidated claims that people 
create reality through communication and that groups create a unified reality 
through communication. Although the theory has Freudian roots, it is primarily 
based on small group research performed by two scholars, Robert Bales at 
Harvard and Ernest G. Bormann at the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities 
(Mohrmann, “An Essay”). Their research dealt initially with how small groups 
create group realities.  
SCT is a “humanistic approach to the rhetorical criticism of human 
communication” (Bormann, Force 3) and forms the vertebrae of FTA. One of the 
key contradistinctions necessary to understand SCT outlined by Bormann is the 
difference between general and specific theories, in which special theories are 
“artistic formulations that [. . .] relate only to the communication practices” 
within a restricted culture to which it can be applied. A general theory, on the 
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other hand, is universally applicable to “the entire process of communication, 
practice, criticism, and special theory as the object of analysis.” SCT is a general 
theory, one that is universally adaptable (Bormann, Force 4).  
How FTA and SCT evolve from the field of small group research to 
application on a large scale to an entire national rhetorical movement and several 
party-wide (e.g. GOP, Democrat) political campaigns is explained by Bormann in 
his essay, “Fantasy and Rhetorical Vision: The Rhetorical Criticism of Social 
Reality.”  
Bormann points to Bales’ research on small groups at Harvard as the 
catalyst to understanding his own small group research he was simultaneously 
performing at the University of Minnesota. Later, however, Bormann distances 
himself from Bales and acknowledges that their individual research went down 
divergent paths (Bormann, “Fantasy and Rhetorical Vision: Ten Years Later” 
290-291).  
The discovery Bales made, published in 1970, was “the dynamic process of 
group fantasizing” (Bormann, “Fantasy and Rhetorical Vision: The Rhetorical 
Criticism of Social Reality” 396). These happenings of group fantasizing occur not 
only in small group situations, Bormann argues, but “also in larger groups 
hearing a public speech” (398).  
Summarily put by Bormann:  
The dramatizations which catch on and chain out in small groups 
are worked into public speeches and into the mass media and, in 
turn, spread out across larger publics, serve to sustain the members’ 
sense of community, to impel them strongly to action (which raises 
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the question of motivation), and to provide them with a social 
reality filled with heroes, villains, emotions, and attitudes. (398) 
 Narratives are the historical basis of FTA. For a narrative to be counted as 
a fantasy it must involve real or imagined characters that takes place in a “setting 
other than the here-and-now communication of the group” (Bormann, Force 4). 
That is, a discussion over a current conflict would not count as a narrative to be 
studied in a FTA. Once a discussion about either a past or future, but not present, 
conflict or event occurs, the basis for study emerges. The narrative takes on a 
technical term once it meets this requirement: fantasy. Fantasy in this context is 
different from, say, the Oxford American Dictionary denotation, “the faculty or 
activity of imagining things, esp. things that are impossible or improbable,” or the 
popular connotations it elicits in many persons’ minds. In the context of 
performing a FTA on a text, Bormann states as the definition of fantasy: “The 
creative and imaginative interpretation of events that fulfills a psychological or 
rhetorical need.” Although fantasies in their technical use can represent “fictious 
scripts of imaginary characters,” they also may represent “things that have 
actually happened” (Bormann, Force 5)10.  
 The primary purpose of performing a FTA, according to Bormann, is to 
find evidence that symbolic convergence has taken place. The following clues 
should be looked for to verify the presence that symbolic convergence has 
occurred. First, “similar dramatizing material” (i.e., wordplay, narratives, figures, 
                                                
10 Much recent scholarship concerning Bormann’s FTA has been done by scholar Joshua Gunn 
who argues that rhetorical scholarship concerning imagination would be well served by not 
omitting the unconscious nature of imagination. Gunn points to the strong connection between 
Freudian thought and FTA as evidence that imagination can exist in unconsciousness. 
Scholarship should, he writes, consider the collective unconscious of audiences in rhetorical 
studies concerning imagination and invention (Gunn). 
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and analogies) could provide evidence that symbolic convergence has taken 
place. Cryptic allusions to symbolic common ground could serve as another clue; 
this is commonly identified as the “inside-joke phenomenon.” The allusion does 
not need to be an inside joke, but could be a word, phrase, or non-verbal clue that 
“may arouse tears or evoke anger, hatred, love, and affection, as well as laughter 
and humor” (Bormann, Force 6). Presence of such triggers inside the discourse, 
that is, the text to be examined are clear evidence that fantasy theme sharing has 
occurred.  
 Speaking of fantasy theme sharing, sharing of fantasy themes occurs 
through a process known as chaining. As people in groups become more excited, 
involved, and attached to the fantasies that emerge, the fantasy is said to “chain 
out.” Chaining occurs not only in small groups, but also: 
In face-to-face interacting groups, in speaker-audience 
transactions, in viewers of television broadcasts, in listeners to 
radio programs, and in all the diverse settings for public and 
intimate communication in a given society. Once such a rhetorical 
vision emerges it contains dramatis personae and typical plot lines 
that can be alluded to in all communication contexts and spark a 
response reminiscent of the original emotional chain. The same 
dramas can be developed in detail when the occasion demands to 
generate emotional response. (Bormann, “Fantasy and Rhetorical 
Criticism of Social Reality” 398) 
Once it has been established that fantasies and symbolic convergence have 
occurred, fantasy types begin to emerge. Bormann gives the example of St. Paul’s 
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conversion on the road to Damascus as an example in his book The Force of 
Fantasy. Paul, he says, experienced the first “new birth” after a paradigm 
shattering emotional conversion, which has been repeated countless times since 
St. Paul’s experience. This is an example of a “stock scenario,” which is a scenario 
continuously and repeatedly reenacted by different, but similar, persons in 
different contexts. These stock scenarios are known as fantasy types (7).  
 Thus it has been established that fantasy types emerge from fantasy 
sharing, and fantasy types lead to the emergence of rhetorical visions. “Rhetorical 
visions are often integrated by the sharing of a dramatizing message that contains 
a master analogy,” writes Bormann. Generally the master analogy is pulled 
together through a key word or slogan. Some recent rhetorical visions in 
American history include the New Deal, Black Power, and The Moral Majority 
(8). A rhetorical community emerges from such rhetorical visions and 
membership is often formalized. Formalization would take place for members of 
the rhetorical vision of Born Again Christians through baptism, for members of 
China’s Communist Party through carrying a card, and most importantly for this 
proposed thesis, through all adults of the Juche rhetorical community wearing a 
badge of either Kim Il Sung or Kim Jong Il over their hearts every time they 
appear in public (Iyer, “In the Land” 48). The first and last of the previous 
examples are examples of what Bormann calls life-style rhetorical visions. This 
self-explanatory description implies that the rhetorical vision has encompassed 
“an individual’s social reality in all aspects of living” (Bormann, Force 8).  
 Fantasies, the core of FTA, are at their core stories about people. 
According to Bormann, “Interpreting events in terms of human action allows us 
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to assign responsibility, to praise or blame, to arouse and propitiate guilt, to hate 
and to love.” Simply put, to understand the world around us. Human experiences 
are often confusing; however, fantasy themes are “organized and artistic” (9). 
Because of the central role of human narrative in FTA and the dramatic nature of 
FTA characters that represent protagonists and antagonists (heroes and villains) 
are employed in the narratives. These dramas “always interpret, slant, suggest, 
and persuade.” In short, create meaning. Specifically, they create communal 
meaning (10). 
 The origins of FTA are often the result of groups beginning to share 
fantasies together. An example could be a committee meeting at which a new idea 
for implementing podcasts of lectures into the curriculum of a university’s 
department. If such an idea were proposed, and the committee approved of the 
idea and excitement were built around the idea and a brainstorming session 
ensued, a fantasy would have been born. However, some, albeit fewer, rhetorical 
visions, particularly life-style rhetorical visions, are begun when “one creative 
person fantasizes a powerful personal consciousness and does so with such skill 
that his or her consciousness is shared by converts and becomes the rhetorical 
vision that forms a community’s consciousness” (Bormann, Force 10). Such is the 
origin of the rhetorical vision of Juche, formed at the conclusion of the Korean 
War by Kim Il Sung. It is a life-style rhetorical vision shared by the national 
community of North Korea.  
 In short, rhetorical visions, born out of fantasy types, born out of the 
chaining out of fantasies, which are simply narratives about people or using 
personification, are tools used for communities to “identify their collective 
Warner  23 
selves11” (Bormann, Force 11). Fantasies that clearly divide “us” from “them” by 
applying labels of “evil” to “them” are particularly powerful. As Bormann writes 
in his essay on Social Criticism, “The explanatory power of the fantasy chain 
analysis lies in its ability to account for the development, evolution, and decay of 
dramas that catch up groups of people and change their behavior” (399).  
 The above description of FTA is from Bormann’s point of view. He, and his 
theory, are not without criticism. Most of the criticism makes gentle 
recommendations towards making FTA a stronger framework to perform 
rhetorical studies. But some – notably G.P. Mohrmann – are advocates of FTA 
being abolished in its entirety.  
 Mohrmann and Bormann actually, in 1982, had an open debate through 
the Quarterly Journal of Speech, in which each would air his opinion and 
research on FTA, Bormann clearly arguing for FTA, Mohrmann vehemently 
opposed to it. Mohrmann, though, was not pleased with the dialogue: 
Having accepted “An Essay on Fantasy Theme Criticism,” (QJS, 
May 1982) the Editor suggested that the discussion continue, and 
when agreement was reached, a copy of my essay was forwarded 
prior to its publication, with the understanding that I would receive 
a response in time to react before the August deadline. All the 
deadlines were met. From that I take satisfaction – and I must. I 
must because there is so little else in the exchange that can gladden 
my heart. (“Fantasy Theme Criticism” 306) 
                                                
11 The rhetorical vision of Juche, it should be noted, began as a narrative about the Korean people 
as enunciated first by Kim Il Sung.  
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 Mohrmann is pessimistic due to his perception that the response to his 
prior essay had been mostly a glorification of the publication of FTA, with 
minimum content addressed to his grievances. His primary complaints are two-
fold, the first being with the historic basis of SCT. Research by Bales is the mark 
in his attack. Bales was a Freudian, “Freudian theory [. . .] is linchpin in Bales’ 
interpretation of fantasy,” writes Mohrmann (308). Yet, Bales rejected Freudian 
thought as the basis of his work on studying fantasy chaining in small groups. 
This leads Mohrmann to rant, “Surely we have a right to ask for – no, demand – 
an acceptable alternative, a rationale of substantial theoretical grounding” (308). 
Additionally, Mohrmann also complains that applying small group-based 
principles of fantasy chaining to other forms of communication is ill advised: 
It is one thing to acknowledge fantasy chains and their functions in 
the histories of groups, but it is quite another matter to argue that 
the fantasy chain is a quintessential symptom of symbolic processes 
obtaining in all forms of communication, still another to argue 
concomitantly that to understand the phenomenon in the small 
group is to establish a purchase throughout the realm of symbolic 
transactions. Wanting to an acceptable rationale, those claims 
border on the magniloquent. (308)  
 As you can see, Mohrmann was not a fan of the theories of Robert Freed 
Bales, a professor emeritus at Harvard, who died in 2004.  
 Bormann himself summarily dismisses Mohrmann’s critiques in another 
1982 essay.  
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The most important criticism of FTA during the 1978 SCA Seminar 
was not provided by Mohrmann’s long attack on Bales and Freud 
nor by his quest for more evidence connecting small group 
processes with other communicative contexts nor his charge that 
sharing fantasies does not motivate action. Rather, it was Hart, who 
was in overall sympathy with the approach, who raised the most 
cogent questions. (“Fantasy and Rhetorical Vision: Ten Years Later 
293) 
 Roderick Hart’s main criticism was that “FTA is not cut out of a theoretical 
wholecloth” (qtd. in “Fantasy and Rhetorical Vision: Ten Years Later” 293). 
Bormann’s reply is: “no research program worth its salt should wait for a 
theoretical whole-cloth to be produced before studies begin.” He argues that a 
“theoretical frame is emerging” (293).   
 In fact, Bormann’s response to Mohrmann is relegated to the last pages of 
the article, in which he criticizes Mohrmann’s diction and clarity and offers a 
measured response to each of Mohrmann’s claims (302-305).  
 The fight between Mohrmann and Bormann is largely cleared up by 
Charles E. Williams. Bormann had equated his FTA to a horse which he was 
riding as hard as he could, leaving it to other scholars to reign the theory “within 
its proper limits” (qtd. in Williams 11). Mohrmann responded by beginning his 
aptly named article, “Fantasy Theme Criticism: A Peroration” by quoting 
Laurence Stern’s The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman, “De 
gustibus non est disputandum; - that is, there is no disputing against HOBBY-
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HORSES” (306). This was a not-so-subtle allusion that the horse that Bormann 
was riding was in fact a hobbyhorse.  
 Williams makes it fairly clear that the 1982 QJS debate had turned mostly 
into two persons arguing their own point of views. His literature review quotes 
Farrell, saying that: 
FTA has made “real and significant contribution to the critical 
literature” by succeeding in “its stated aim of grouping together 
aspects of discourse and social reality that might otherwise have 
been overlooked.” (4)  
 However, Williams’ main goal is not to clear up the controversy raging in 
the early 1980s of the execution of FTA, but to outline how one performs a FTA. 
This article will be crucial and very helpful in performing a FTA on Juche. This 
article, in conjunction with Bormann’s seminal book-length application of FTA, 
will serve as apt guides to utilize this method of rhetorical criticism to Juche. 
William’s article will be discussed further in the methodology chapter.  
 In summation, in spite of some early (and some continued) objections to 
the saliency of FTA this author will use this theory based on his own perceptions 
of its ability to explain how Juche is successfully “sold” to the people of North 
Korea, most of whom have “bought into” the rhetorical vision that it is. More 
importantly, dozens of articles, dissertations, and master’s theses have been 
written using FTA, many of them recently, showing that FTA continues to be a 
widely accepted practice of rhetorical criticism in the communication scholarship 
world.  
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Further, a “Fantasy Theme” is defined by James A. Herrick as “a story line 
involving characters with whom individuals may identify themselves and other 
members of their organization or group, and plots that these characters can 
participate in acting out.” (235) 
 There are more than 20 million individuals who identify themselves with 
the idea of Juche, as pure Korean nationals who are completely self-reliant. 
Nobody has written academically about Juche from the perspective of the identity 
of the proletariat and its socialistic viewpoint. 
Bormann writes that fantasy themes cause groups to become “excited, 
involved” and that the realities chain out to create, “a common symbolic reality 
filled with heroes and villains” (399). This idea fits the Juche idea perfectly, in 
that the North Korean government must continuously uphold a continual and 
literal fantasy. Theoretically each member of North Korean society (aside from 
those in political prisons with their families) believes in the evils of America – 
whom they view as an occupying force in South Korea.  
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III. Methodology  
General Application of FTA to Juche 
 The primary goal of the proposed study is to understand and then explain 
how Juche captured the hearts and minds of the North Korean people, and how it 
has been maintained by the citizens of the DPRK in spite of evidence suggesting 
its failure. This will be done by examining the efficacy of the rhetorical vision 
from 1955, when the vision was originally cast to the North Korean population, 
through an important Juche-defining speech given by Kim Il Sung December 28, 
and then examine a speech given in 1990 by Kim Jong Il in order to examine the 
evolution and history of the adoption of the Juche idea (Kim 135, v.2). 
In terms of “heroes and villains,” consider what Kim Il Sung wrote in 1965 
in a letter to the president of the Korean Affairs Institute in Washington D.C.: 
The US imperialists have brought south Korea completely under 
their colonial domination in all political, economic, military and 
cultural fields and brought utter ruin to the life of its people [. . .] 
Any people who have the least spark of national conscience ought to 
demand the withdrawal of the US troops and work to expel them 
from our territory. We must stir up the indignation of the entire 
nation against the US imperialist aggressors and mobilize all the 
patriotic forces in the struggle to drive the US army out of south 
Korea12. (Juche 2: 389-390) 
                                                
12 Interestingly, American troops were almost withdrawn from South Korea by Jimmy Carter, who 
campaigned for the presidency on a platform partially based on bringing all American troops 
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 In fact, one of the main tenets of Juche is that America is a colonial force 
that is bent on world domination through forcible submission. Creating fear of 
American invasion is key to maintaining the Juche ideology amongst the 
proletariat. As Alan Kang writes, in order to hold economic and political stability 
together in North Korea Kim Jong Il must be certain to portray to his compatriots 
that danger, war, and invasion are imminent. Violence, revolution, and reaction-
ism are axioms of Marxism. Without something to fight against and rebel against 
Juche cannot survive (48). 
 Much of the communication used to create and maintain the national idea 
of Juche could be considered propaganda. Very few studies previously have 
looked at symbolic convergence experiences born out of movements that used 
propaganda13. Even so, this study is not without precedent. The book Rhetoric of 
the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Impact on Chinese Thought, Culture, and 
Communication by Xing Lu analyzes a large number of artifacts used to uphold 
Maoist thought and the ideals of the Cultural Revolution; among the rhetorical 
criticism performed in Lu’s book is a fantasy theme analysis. In chapter five she 
writes that “mass hypnosis” and “myth and mass hysteria” are achieved through 
group fantasy:  
                                                                                                                                            
home from Korea. However, South Korean lobbying, heavy criticism, and congress generally 
persuaded Carter to renege his plan by 1979 (Martin 138 – 139, 792). 
13 Study of propaganda use in China has found three goals of propagandist communication: 1. 
Create a new communist persona; 2. Mobilize the masses to support the Party; and 3. Repress 
political dissent. These goals are in line with North Korea’s goals. The findings of the efficacy of 
the three goals are that the highest efficacy is in the third goal, repression, while support of the 
Party had moderate success, and the reshaping of the ideals of Chinese persons into communist 
ideologues was the least successful. The extension of this research to this thesis is that the same 
can be presumed by China’s close neighbor, North Korea, thus lending more credibility to the 
legitimate acceptance of the lifestyle rhetorical vision of Juche in the DPRK (Zhu). 
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According to Ernest Bormann (1972), a group fantasy is created 
through the communication process in a dramatic setting, which 
leads to a rhetorical vision that provides a coherent and mythic view 
to hold the public together. Slogans eulogizing Mao and sloganized 
Maoist quotations functioned in this way. (70) 
 The “coherent and mythic view” held by Chinese during the Cultural 
Revolution can be considered analogous to North Korea’s adoption of the Juche 
ideology.  
Further, an unpublished dissertation from the University of Iowa 
performed a FTA on cults, “The Rhetoric of the New Religious Cults: A Fantasy 
Theme Analysis of the Rhetoric of the Unification Church.” Finally, a peer-
reviewed study in Journal of Communication Inquiry, “Web of Hate: A Fantasy 
Theme Analysis of the Rhetorical Vision of Hate Groups Online” analyzes the 
efficacy of the persuasiveness of hate groups operating on the World Wide Web. 
All three of these studies illustrate that; although FTA has seldom been 
performed concerning rhetorical visions achieved through the use of coercion or 
propaganda; it has been done before and has been well received. Further still, 
Bormann does not eliminate the possibility of performing a FTA on artifacts that 
may be coercive or propagandist; the fantasy in FTA must fulfill “a psychological 
or rhetorical need” (Bormann, Force 5).  Juche does just that in the lives of the 
North Korean people.  
Additionally, FTA creates in an individual a sense of identity and meaning 
that averts the pressures of social and natural disasters (Bormann, “Fantasy and 
Rhetorical Vision: The Rhetorical Criticism of Social Reality” 400). North Korea 
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has been suffering both continuously since 1991. Hardly a year has gone by which 
has not been marked by natural disaster and an economy on the brink of utter 
collapse. One of the functions of the modern iteration of Juche is to create a 
reality that blames American imperialism on the suffering economy of North 
Korea. According to Alan Kang’s analysis of North Korean propaganda, “By peace 
the imperialists mean aggression and war” (45). 
 As Scott Snyder writes: “At the level of the state, survival, endurance and 
resistance against foreign forces who seek to dominate or subjugate the Korean 
people are recurrent historical themes that date back to the Tang Dynasty” (qtd. 
in Alan Kang 42). Juche is part of an illusion declaring “the nation to be 
independent and free in all domestic affairs of the nation, unaffected by 
international circumstances” (Alan Kang 43). This is in sharp contrast to the 
intense international food aid the country currently receives. 
The current efficacy of this illusion can be seen in the article “North Korea’s Top 
Ideologue,” which comments on the internal state of affairs after Hwang Jang 
Yop, one of Kim Il Sung’s closest advisors, defected through the South Korean 
Consulate in Beijing. Hwang Jang-Yop14 wrote a memo repudiating the idea that 
North Korea might collapse in “two to three years” as predicted by former CIA 
director John Deutch. “There is no risk of North Korea collapsing because it is 
politically very united,” Hwang said (Bartholet and Lui). It is also noteworthy that 
the North Korean position on Hwang’s defection is that he was kidnapped by 
South Korea (Butler and Palmer). 
                                                
14 Hwang Jang-yop was Kim Il-Sung’s ideology secretary from 1958 – 1965 (Martin 116). He also 
served as president of Kim Il-sung University (Martin 170).  
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 The national political unity under Juche is in part due to “the 
understanding of the world that Kim Jong Il creates and becomes a virtually 
unquestioned reality for North Korea’s elite and its people” (Alan Kang 42). 
Methodology 
The method used to understand Juche in this thesis is fantasy theme 
analysis, developed by Professor Emeritus at the University of Minnesota, Ernest 
G. Bormann. This theory is apt at explaining the origins and nature of social 
movements. In the first book to use the rhetorical critical method of fantasy 
theme analysis, The Force of Fantasy: Restoring the American Dream, the theory 
is explained and then applied to religious persuasive communication from the 
Puritans of the late 16th century through the time of President Reagan. In this 
thesis the same method will be applied to Juche.  
The steps necessary to perform a FTA are laid out by Bormann, in brief, in 
his essay “Fantasy and Rhetorical Vision,” and his book The Force of Fantasy. 
Bormann’s essay lays out a five-step process. First, the critic must collect 
evidence that points to the existence of a rhetorical vision. Once evidence has 
been collected the scholar’s job begins, step two’s task is to discover and describe 
the narrative that chained out. When the narrative has been discovered the 
scholar-critic is then able to examine the narrative for patterns of 
characterizations and settings. With the narrative and patterns have been 
established the rhetorical vision must be creatively reconstructed. Finally, 
specific questions must be asked in relation to the elements of the dramas found 
in the texts studied. These five steps are outlined more fully below.  
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1.) Collect Evidence 
This crucial step involves discovering and selecting the text or texts to be 
used as evidence of the rhetorical vision and subsequent analysis. For any FTA 
this evidence can be video, audio, manuscripts, recollection of participants, or the 
researcher’s direct observations. 
In North Korea all media is limited to official propaganda tools; the nation 
only has one television station, two radio stations, one newspaper, and one 
magazine. It is possible to strictly apply Ernest Bormann’s Fantasy Theme 
Analysis to any of these media, as he writes in his illuminating essay, Fantasy 
and Rhetorical Vision: The Rhetorical Criticism of Social Reality: “A rhetorical 
vision is constructed from fantasy themes that chain out in face-to-face 
interacting groups, in speaker-audience transitions, in viewers of television 
broadcasts, in listeners to radio programs, and in all the diverse settings for 
public and intimate communication in a given society” (398). 
Of all the available options considered, speeches given by Kim Il and his 
successor, Kim Jong Il, were chosen. The reason for choosing speeches is based 
on their fit to FTA texts as outlined by Bormann and the relative availability of 
speech manuscripts in English.  
For this thesis I selected two manuscripts from among thousands of 
discrete texts available and translated into English. The texts used are 
manuscripts of speeches, both given to Korean Workers Party loyalists in 
Pyongyang, and published by the DPRK’s Foreign Language Press, as well as 
presses sympathetic to the DPRK.  
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Several scholars outlined very specifically that one speech, given in 1955 by 
Kim Il Sung, was the seminal speech of the establishment of Juche15. For 
example, Ralph C. Hassig writes that this particular speech, “sets forth the core 
Juche idea of national self-reliance and pride” (Lee 17). More explicitly Hy-Sang 
Lee defines the etymology of the Juche as stemming from a term suitable to 
describe either master or bodily self-control. He writes, “[Kim Il Sung] first 
enunciated the Juche idea in the often-referenced speech of December 28, 1955, 
“On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Juche in 
Ideological Work” (Lee 26).  
Kim Il Sung’s writings and teachings on Juche have been judiciously 
published by the now defunct Weekly Guardian Associates, formerly based in 
New York City.  The  manuscript for “On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism 
and Establishing Juche in Ideological Work” was taken from their book Juche: In 
Our Revolution, a collection of speeches, presentations, question and answer 
sessions, and writings by Kim Il Sung published in two volumes. These two 
volumes contain more than 1000 pages. Further, North Korea has published 
Works, a 44-volume set, which is said to be a complete compilation of the 
teaching, writing, and speeches of Kim Il Sung. In short, analyzing Kim Il Sung’s 
Works alone would constitute an analysis of 1300 plus individual manuscripts.  
On the other hand, Kim Jong Il, the orator of the second speech 
manuscript, is tremendously private and since he took power of North Korea 
after the death of his father in 1994 he has seldom spoken in public. However, 
                                                
15 Bradley K. Martin also mentions that the introduction of Juche came from this speech, “It was 
in that 1955 speech that Kim gave full voice to his arguments for Juche” (Martin 111).  
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cross referencing articles found in the Northwest Florida Daily News, Kim Jong 
Il’s official biography16, as downloaded from the official DPRK website: 
www.korea-dpr.com, globalsecurity.org, the New York Times, unpublished 
master’s thesis, and other sources I have found the most prominent recent speech 
given by Kim Il Sung dealing with the Juche idea is the 1990 speech, “Let Us 
Prepare the Young People Thoroughly as Reliable Successors to the 
Revolutionary Cause of Juche.” 
The full-text of this speech is available on the Uriminzokkiri website, 
which is presumably operated by the Korea Central News Agency (KCNA), the 
media arm of the DPRK, from a server in China17. It is also available in pamphlet 
form from the DPRK’s Foreign Language Press. Only six manuscripts of this 
speech exist in North America, the Library of Congress’s copy was loaned for this 
paper. Thus, I was able to compare the pamphlet and the online text for accuracy 
and have verified their congruence. The second speech was delivered January 17, 
1990 to the Senior Officials of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of 
Korea. The speech is dated, as it is 18 years old, but the major transformation, 
according to research done at the Korean National Library in Seoul by Mr. Lee, a 
friend of mine18, found that the major transformation of the Juche idea occurred 
in the 1970s, and the 45-year gap between the two speeches is enough to 
accurately document the differences between the inception of Juche at the 
beginning of the cold war and its state after the collapse of the Iron Curtain. It is 
                                                
16 Kim Il Sung’s biography was also used as a source to verify the importance of Kim Il Sung’s 1955 
speech. 
17 I was unable to verify the veracity of this claim, but have no reason to believe otherwise.  
18 The author’s friend, Mr. Lee, is also a North Korean refugee and graduate of Kim Il Sung 
University. He escaped from North Korea into China in 1997 and finally entered South Korea 
where he claimed asylum and was granted citizenship in 2001.   
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for this reason that two speeches were chosen. One will be analyzed to establish 
the nature of “original” Juche while the second will be analyzed in order to 
understand “modern” Juche. 
2.) Discover and Describe the Narrative that Chained Out 
Narratives in the speeches chosen showed themselves to be easily 
identifiable. The villains, generally imperialist and colonialist nation-states, and 
heroes, generally the Korean people and the Korean Workers Party, are clearly 
recognizable, as explained in Chapter 4, Analysis. The narratives found in these 
speeches are characterized by praising past exploits as motivation for continuing 
the Korean struggle for a socialist utopia.  
3.) Look for Patterns of Characterizations and of Setting 
The characterizations and settings are generally at sites of either 
ideological or literal socialist construction, with characterizations portraying all 
of Korea as inherently and inexplicably revolutionary.  
4.) Creatively Reconstruct the Rhetorical Vision 
Two visions are recreated in this thesis, the vision of “original” Juche, as 
seen in 1955, as well as “modern” Juche based on the 1990’s speech.  
5.) Ask Specific Questions Relating to the Elements of the Dramas 
Questions adapted from Bormann’s work included in this thesis are: Who are 
the dramatis personae? How does the fantasy theme work to attract the 
unconverted? Who are the heroes and the villains? And, How are the members of 
the rhetorical community characterized?  
 There are several more questions, but Bormann writes, “A critic need not, 
of course, raise all of such questions for a given piece of criticism but for some in-
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depth critiques of a single message the critic might ask more questions and 
search for more details” (402).  
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IV. Emerging Juche: The Vision Serves the People 
Introduction to Kim Il Sung’s “On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and 
Establishing Juche in Ideological Work” 
My good friend Mr. Lee, a North Korean refugee living in Lynchburg, 
Virginia, told me about his escape from a regime that said he must go to college 
to study geophysical surveying. He wanted to be a doctor. He told me how his 
father starved to death, as did one of his nephews, in the great famine of the 
1990s. Not incidentally, this famine was brought about not directly by natural 
disaster, as the popular media like to report, but it was the result of a catastrophic 
failure of the Juche ideology. Succinctly, one of the tenants of Juche is self-
reliance. Kim Il Sung himself said in 1966 that part of Juche is creating a state of 
“self-sustenance in the economy” (429, v.1). So, in the 1990s as part of a 
nationwide expansion of the agriculture industry Kim Jong Il had the idea to 
expand the arable land of the nation by expanding it to the hills and mountains of 
North Korea (which is a rugged nation, geographically speaking). This arable land 
movement led to the deforestation of mountainsides, which – when the rains 
came – meant the water rushed down the barren “arable” mountainsides which 
had been cleared of the natural buffering trees. The lack of trees led to the 
mountainside being washed out, pouring silt and water into the valleys, leading 
to massive flooding. Since Kim Jong Il’s campaign was nationwide, virtually the 
entire nation’s agriculture was destroyed, with the mountainside agricultural 
plots being washed away and the valleys being layered in silt even after the 
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floodwaters receded, all as a result of Juche’s tenant of “self reliance” in economic 
matters (Kim, “Agricultural”). 
It is not floods, though, that urge me to write about Juche. My friend Mr. 
Lee said it best when he said the biggest problems are not the famine, the 
concentration camps, religious persecution, constant government surveillance, or 
nuclear weapons. The greatest ill of Juche is that it destroys people’s minds. I 
agree with my friend’s claim and am convinced that the plight of 20 million 
North Korean citizens who, today in 2008, live under a system of Juche must be 
investigated. The reality of its ambiguity in the Western mind is then not to be 
seen as a hurdle, but as a challenge, a challenge to elucidate, explain, and further 
illuminate Juche as to persons previously in the dark concerning this ideology.  
As covered in the methodology section this chapter will follow a four-step 
process of analyzing Kim Il Sung’s 1955 speech “”On Eliminating Dogmatism and 
Formalism and Establishing Juche in Ideological Work,” Kim Jong Il’s 1990 
speech will be analyzed in the following chapter. The first step of analysis is to 
discover and describe the narrative that chained out. Second, Look for patterns of 
characterization and of setting. Third, reconstruct the rhetorical vision, and 
finally, ask and answer specific questions relating to the elements of the dramas.  
The questions that will be answered in the final and fourth step of this 
chapter are the following, adapted from Bormann’s essay “Fantasy and Rhetorical 
Vision: The Rhetorical Criticism of Social Reality”: Who are the dramatis 
personae? How does the fantasy theme work to attract the unconverted? Who are 
the heroes and the villains? How are the members of the rhetorical community 
characterized? (402). However, before this methodology can begin a historical 
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summary will be provided to set the context for the speech analyzed in this 
chapter. 
The speech in question was delivered by Kim Il Sung on December 28, 
1955 in Pyongyang to the Party Propaganda and Agitation Workers, a division of 
the Korean Workers Party. This speech has been pinpointed by several scholars 
of the DPRK as the origination of Juche as a national imperative and as such can 
be considered the most important speech on Juche given. The title, “On 
Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Juche in Ideological 
Work,” and the content of the speech quite literally set the stage for the rest of 
North Korean history, even up to the present moment.  
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Fig. 1. Kim Jong Il on a Billboard in Pyongyang. from Tatlow, Dermot. “Taking 
Photographs in North Korea.” Nieman Reports. 2004. 
It must be noted that in many ways Juche in the Democratic People’s 
Republic of North Korea today is similar to Juche as envisioned by Kim Il Sung in 
1955. However, it has also changed dramatically from a Marxist-Leninist based 
ideology into a rudimentary theocracy and ersatz religion (Hale 283, Park 254). 
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The analysis of this speech, while able to stand alone, does not adequately 
address Juche as a whole, rather, it lays the historical groundwork of the ideology 
which the next chapter will build upon.  
To fully understand how Juche became a lifestyle rhetorical vision it is 
imperative to first be aware of the situation on the Korean peninsula in the 20th 
century up to the middle of the century. A brief history of Korea leading up to the 
implementation of Juche is provided below. 
Historical Background 
North Korea is an island among nation-states. It has been known for 
generations as the “hermit kingdom.” Recently Kim Jong Il and his repressive 
nation have been in the spotlight for their attempt to build up a nuclear arsenal 
and, in recent history, a devastating famine that swept through the nation in the 
1990s.  
 The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, as North Korea formally calls 
itself, is used to being in the international spotlight. Centuries ago they were 
dubbed “a shrimp among whales,” due to their strategic position between China, 
Russia, and Japan and their relatively diminutive size. This title, which is not 
honorific, is fitting. Nearly 40 years before WWII the Korean peninsula had been 
colonized by Japan, in the harshest sense of the word. During the occupation of 
Korea by Japan an attempt to assimilate the Korean people into Japanese culture 
through the devastation of their culture via oppression and subjugation created 
resentment amongst the Koreans. The Japanese were slowly chipping their 
nationality away, year after year. The occupation lasted from 1910 to 1945.  
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 After WWII Korea was, in a sense, liberated from Japanese colonialism. 
However, the liberation led to a new problem, unification. The disagreement of 
the Allies of WWII over which form of government with which to govern led to 
two nations being established; above the 38th parallel was the DPRK governed by 
the U.S.S.R. and communism and below South Korea, governed by the United 
States and representative democracy.  
 After the DPRK was given a measure of autonomy it wasn’t long until they 
invaded South Korea, attempting to re-unify Korea through force. The Korean 
War, as we now know it, pitted Chinese and North Korean soldiers against South 
Korea and the United Nations, at the time led militarily by the United States. This 
war’s importance cannot be underestimated in the role it plays and has played in 
developing, strengthening, and upholding the Juche idea. America, in this war, 
bombed North Korea extensively, literally flattening the capital city of Pyongyang 
and destroying a majority of the infrastructure and heavy industry factories of the 
nation. 
 It is in the wake of these three conditions: the colonization of Korea by 
Japan, the separation of Korea by the Allies of WWII, and the destruction of the 
subsequent civil war between North and South that laid a fertile ground for a life-
style rhetorical vision, which Ernest Bormann says is “so all-encompassing and 
impelling that they permeate an individual’s social reality in all aspects of living” 
(Force, 8).  
Analysis 
1.) Discover and Describe the Narrative the Chained Out 
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First, the narrative that constitutes the substance of the fantasy theme 
must be established. “The scholar’s main task,” writes Bormann, “in making a 
fantasy theme analysis is to find evidence that symbolic convergence has taken 
place” (Force, 6). The evidence of fantasy theme analysis may be wordplay, 
narratives, figures, and analogies, which occur repetitively. These evidences are 
“similar dramatizing material.” This step sets the groundwork for the remainder 
of the application of fantasy theme analysis. 
 Bormann writes that in order for dramatizing messages to be considered 
part of a fantasy theme analysis and constitute symbolic convergence the event 
must have happened in the past or be occurring in the future. The present cannot 
account for symbolic convergence. The narratives, or dramatizing material, in 
fantasy theme analysis represent, “creative and imaginative interpretation of 
events that [fulfill] a psychological or rhetorical need (Bormann, Force 5).  
 Symbolic convergence is evident in the text of Kim Il Sung’s December 
28th speech to the Party Propaganda and Agitation Workers. The narratives are 
reoccurring, and evident from the beginning of his speech, in the opening 
paragraph Kim sets the stage for dramatizing material and the requisite creative 
reimagining of the future and the past, opening by saying he will address 
shortcomings in the Korean Workers Party ideological work “and how to 
eliminate them in the future” (135, v.1). Much of his creative re-interpretation of 
past events deals with Korean history, which he outlines as important because 
failure to understand the past “does much harm to our revolutionary cause” (Kim 
136, v.1). 
Warner  45 
 Understanding Korean history is crucial in understanding Juche, 
according to Kim Il Sung. Speaking of the propaganda workers he was addressing 
he said: 
Why does our ideological work suffer from dogmatism and 
formalism? Why do our propaganda and agitation workers only 
embellish the façade and fail to go deeply into matters, and why do 
they merely copy and memorize things foreign, instead of working 
creatively? This offers us serious food for reflection.  
What is Juche in our Party’s ideological work? What are we 
doing? We are not engaged in any other country’s revolution, but 
solely in the Korean revolution. When we study the history of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the history of the Chinese 
revolution, or the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism, it is 
entirely for the purpose of correctly carrying out or own revolution. 
(135-136, v.1) 
 It is clearly evident from this passage that the emphasis of Juche is on 
Korea, which explains why, in spite of speaking briefly on the Chinese cultural 
revolution and the ongoing worldwide-focused communist revolution in the 
U.S.S.R., sparked in 1917 by the October Revolution, most of his narratives which 
serve as evidence of the symbolic convergence refer to Korea.  
 The narratives that show symbolic convergence has occurred begin on 
page 2 of his printed speech. He makes reference to 1945, ten years prior, and 
tells of how the Korean Workers Party urged Koreans to study and learn Korean 
history, as the foundation of revolution. From this reimagining of the past he 
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predicts the future, saying that the future of Korea will have seen the stimulation 
“of [Korean] national pride and rouse the broad masses to revolutionary 
struggles” (136, v.1). In the following three pages there are 12 references to past 
events, which are creatively re-imagined. Including dramatic narratives about 
mistakes made by Pak Chang Ok “and his kind” (136, v.1), the retelling of the 
Kwangju Student Incident in which Kim Il Sung claims “tens of thousands of 
Korean students and other young people rose against Japanese imperialism,” and 
another past-future comparison of his visiting a People’s Army rest home: 
Once I visited a People’s Army rest home, where there was a picture 
of the Siberian Steppe on the wall. Russians probably like that 
landscape. But we Korean people prefer the beautiful scenery of our 
own country … if we are to inspire in our People’s Armymen a love 
for their native place and their country, we must display many 
pictures of our landscapes (139, v1).  
 Bormann writes: “The most important element of dramatizing messages 
for the rhetorical tradition of romantic pragmatism is a narrative or story about 
real or fictious people in a dramatic situation or setting other than the here-and-
now communication of the group” (Force 4). It must be said that a speech 
standing on its own is not evidence of a fantasy chaining out. In the original 
research in small group communication performed by Bormann which led to 
fantasy theme analysis he found that some fantasizing “fell on deaf ears” while 
others shared the fantasy, evidenced by group members who “grew excited, 
interrupted one another, laughed, showed emotion, and forgot their self-
consciousness” (Force 5). The large group equivalent of this would be members 
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paying close attention, through emotionally audible cues from the audience, and 
in the case of the Puritan services that Bormann wrote about by “verbal 
exclamations such as “Hallelujah!” and “Glory be to God!” (Force 5).   
This is impossible to perceive from a speech that is only recorded in print; 
however, there is clear evidence that the group bought into the narratives. 
Membership in groups can be categorized by “formal symbols” including 
“induction ceremonies, confirmation and baptism, paying dues, and carrying a 
card” (Force 8). In China members of the rhetorical vision of Chinese Communist 
Party carry a card, in North Korea every adult member of the Juche rhetorical 
vision – to show allegiance to the father of Juche – wears a badge of either Kim Il 
Sung or his son and protégé Kim Jong Il (Iyer, “In the Land” 48).  This is true in 
2008, which not only establishes the legitimacy of the rhetorical vision that was 
born from this speech, but the long-lasting legacy of Juche. Rhetorical visions 
given by Bormann include, “The New Deal, The New Frontier, Black Power, The 
Cold War, The New Left, The Silent Majority, and The Moral Majority.” All of 
these rhetorical visions were set in motion after December 28, 1955 and now in 
2008 have all but vanished. Although the U.S. Peace Corps remains from John F. 
Kennedy’s New Frontier, and the Evangelical Political Right are powerful today 
in large part due to the Moral Majority, none have had the consistency of Juche.  
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Figure 2. A couple wear badges of Kim Il Sung on their clothing on their wedding 
day. from Tatlow, Dermot. “Taking Photographs in North Korea.” Nieman 
Reports. 2004. 
2.) Look for Patterns of Characterization and Setting 
Second, after the narratives of the fantasy theme have been described, 
patterns of characterization, including those in the categories of “hero” and 
“villain,” must be identified. Self-identity is important to the Korean people. In 
this rhetorical vision the Korean people, specifically North Koreans, are the 
insiders. Without outsiders (Bormann refers to insiders and outsiders as “heroes” 
and “villains,” respectively) there can be “little drama” (Force 9-10). There are 
two sets of villains outlined in this speech, which is a theme consistent even 
today.  
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Quotations such as the following show the villains: “[The Kwangju Student 
Incident] played a big part in inspiring broad sections of Korean youth with the 
anti-Japanese spirit,” and “The US imperialists scorched our land, massacred our 
innocent people, and are still occupying the southern half of our country. They 
are our sworn enemy, aren’t they?” The villains are primarily the United States of 
America, and also Japan. My friend Mr. Lee, when asked about North Korean 
views of Americans had only one reply, “They are our sworn enemy.” Recently 
my wife told Mr. Lee about an account one of her indirect colleagues, who 
occasionally visits North Korea, reported. The colleague and his associates were 
passing out candy to North Korean children and the colleague asked the children 
if they knew where the people were from. When they responded in the negative 
he told them “from America.” The children ran away screaming, and one peed in 
his pants. Mr. Lee’s reaction: “Of course.” He said this would be a natural 
reaction for children who are taught from birth to hate America.  
This anecdote and the substantiation taken from Kim’s speech affirms 
Bormann's assertion: 
When people share fantasies celebrating the insiders, they answer 
the question “Who are we?” In the process of answering this 
question, they often share fantasies that depict themselves as better 
than outsiders and their rhetorical innovations as an improvement 
over current ways of viewing the world.” (12) 
The most obvious pattern of characterization is the independence of the 
Korean people. In a later speech, in 1966, Kim Il Sung says that Juche ideology 
means “independence in politics, self-sustenance in the economy and self-
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defense in national defense – this is the stand our Party has consistently adhered 
to” (Kim 429, v.2). As phrased in the preface of the volume I am working from, 
which was published by Guardian Associates of New York, a now defunct 
American communist group, Juche means true self-reliance: 
In essence, that the masters of the revolution and the work of 
construction are the masses of the people and that they are also the 
motive forces of the revolution and the work of construction. In 
other words, one is responsible for shaping one’s destiny.  
President Kim Il Sung has said: 
“The Juche idea is based on a philosophical theory that man 
is master of everything and decides everything.” (vii, viii) 
 The Korean people are portrayed by Kim Il Sung as devoted 
revolutionaries who have been prepared for the purely Korean revolution through 
their history. “Devotion to the Korean revolution is Juche in the ideological work 
of our party,” Kim said (136). Kim creatively casts the Korean Workers Party of 
the past as persons with a “fighting spirit” in “the anti-imperialist struggle of our 
people” while caring deeply about the importance of “fine traditions” of Korea 
(136 – 137, 142, v.1). Not only are they parochially-cosmopolite revolutionary 
fighters, they are stalwart and persistent, able to “learn a lesson from failure,” 
with undeniable “revolutionary character,” who even prior to their liberation 
from Japan after WWII were all party to a “nationwide resistance movement 
against Japanese imperialism,” and “under Japanese imperialist rule, the peasant 
movement grew and the revolutionary spirit of the peasantry ran very high” (138, 
141, v.1). Most importantly though, Kim emphasizes an extreme self-reliance and 
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hyper-nationalistic pride, going so far as to specify the correct placement of the 
table of contents of North Korean books in, “the front of the book” (139). Further, 
Kim clearly states the differentiation between the Korean revolution and others’ 
revolutions: 
It is important in our work to grasp revolutionary truth, Marxist-
Leninist truth, and apply it correctly to our actual conditions. There 
should be no set rule that we must follow the Soviet pattern. Some 
advocate the Soviet way and others the Chinese, but is it not high 
time to work out our own?” (143) 
3.) Reconstruct the Rhetorical Vision 
Once the narratives have been described and the patterns of 
characterization established it is the job of the scholar to creatively reconstruct 
the rhetorical vision. The future North Koreans, according to Kim’s speech, if 
they adopt his recreation of the nature of North Koreans, will have higher living 
standards and a stronger national economic system, and “Pyongyang [will be] 
built into a much more beautiful city than before [. . .] This is what will happen 
when we carry out construction successfully” (147).  
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Figure 3. Modern Pyongyang. from World Book. 2005 ed. Software MacKiev 
Company. 2005. 
This fantasy about the future will result in a North Korea that is the envy 
of the South: 
Before liberation, merely to hear that in the Soviet Union the 
working class held power and was building socialism made us yearn 
greatly for that country where we have never been. How then can 
the people in the south not yearn to see the socialist construction in 
the north carried out by our people who are of the same stock as 
they? (148) 
 The “yearning” for socialist construction that will happen in the south 
when they gaze upon the north will lead the south to be “roused to action against 
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US imperialism [. . .] [and] peaceful reunification can be brought about” (148). 
Kim’s optimistic vision of the future on that December 28th was so strong that he 
claimed the Korea Workers Party should begin to consider training North Korean 
communist cadres to be sent into South Korea: “What is wrong with our training 
a large number of Party members in the northern half from now on and assigning 
them to work both in the north and the south after reunification?19” (149). 
It has been said that it is impossible to discuss North Korea without also 
mentioning reunification, this is evident in my interaction with Koreans living in 
central Virginia whom with I’ve had the pleasure of spending time. For example, 
Mr. Yun, a South Korean, and Mr. Lee, my North Korean friend see themselves as 
compatriots of the same nation and see the 38th parallel dividing North and 
South Korea not as a nation-state border, but as a travesty of illegitimate 
separation of a unified people.  
Reunification is, in fact, much of the motivation of the Juche idea: 
I would just like to stress once more the prospects of our revolution. 
Our revolution has two prospects. One is the peaceful reunification 
of our country, and the other is its reunification in circumstances in 
which the forces of imperialism are drastically weakened by a big 
war. (146)  
 Kim further dramatizes this future of peaceful reunification by telling the 
narrative of the hero Kim Gu: 
                                                
19 Journalist Bradley K. Martin, while visiting North Korea in 1978, was told by a tractor factory 
official that Kim Il-Sung told him, “we should produce more tractors so that we could supply 
tractors to the southern part of the country when we reunify” (Martin 143).  
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This is what Kim Gu said: “I have found north Korea to my 
liking [. . .] I thought before that communists were narrow-minded 
and evil people, but I have found that here that you are broad-
minded and generous people.” 
In the view of the fact that even Kim Gu, who once regarded 
communism as an inveterate enemy, changed his ideas of our 
endeavors to build up the country, it is quite easy to imagine what 
workers, peasants, and public figures with a national conscience in 
south Korea will think once they come and see the northern half of 
the country. (147 – 148, v.1) 
 In 1955 a more urgent motivation for the Juche idea and its focus on self-
reliance was reconstruction of the infrastructure of the nation after the 
devastation of the Korean War. This focus on reconstruction was intended to 
impress South Koreans into adopting the Juche rhetorical vision, which would 
subsequently lead to a non-violent communist revolution in the South. In spite of 
the focus on reconstruction, the primary motivation remained reunification.  
 Another sub point of motivation leading towards reunification is anti-
imperialism, manifested most clearly in anti-Americanism and Anti-Japanese 
sentiments. Kim envisioned an Asian “national-liberation movement” in which: 
The peoples of India, Indonesia, Burma, and other 
independent states in Asia and the peoples of the Arab countries are 
fighting for peace and against imperialist aggression.  
All this constitutes a telling blow to imperialism, especially 
US imperialism. As the forces of peace, democracy and socialism 
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grow stronger, the US imperialists will finally be compelled to 
withdraw from Korea. (148, v.1) 
 Here anti-imperialism, the reason for America being the “sworn enemy” of 
North Korea, is not directly a part of the motivation of Juche, but rather a result 
of Kim Il Sung seeing America as an occupier of South Korea and their presence 
as a hurdle to overcome before reunification can become a reality. Although 
peaceful reunification is Juche’s primary goal, Kim makes it clear through a 
narrative of the future in which, if America is involved in another world war, “we 
should be able to defeat it relatively easily … In that case we shall sweep the 
forces of US imperialism from Korea and achieve the reunification of the country” 
(149).  
 Reunification, though, is not the final motivation of Juche. Kim Il Sung 
quoted the commander of the U.S.S.R. army, and said he was in full concurrence. 
“Korean people! [. . .] You hold your happiness in your own hands [. . .] Koreans 
must create their own happiness themselves” (145, v.1). This Russian quote 
embodies the independent nature of Juche as Kim Il Sung envisions it, as the 
pinnacle of the acceptance of Juche leading to a universally enthusiastic Korean 
proletariat which can only occur when the entirety of the masses realize the truth 
of Juche. That is, they “will throw all their energy and zeal into their work when 
they are clearly aware that their labor is for their own happiness” (156, v.1). 
 This lifestyle rhetorical vision of Juche is the result when  “one creative 
person who fantasizes a powerful personal consciousness and does so with such 
skill that his or her consciousness is shared by converts and becomes the 
rhetorical vision that forms a community’s consciousness” (Bormann, Force 10). 
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This is in contrast to how most fantasies develop, through innovation born out of 
several like-minded persons’ discussions.  
The primary fantasy themes in Kim Il Sung’s December 28th speech are the 
Korean people, reunification, anti-American and Japanese imperialism, 
rebuilding of Pyongyang, a peaceful communist revolution in South Korea or, if 
necessary, and an opportune situation arises, violence against the U.S.  
Juche, in its original form, was born out of a historical situation in which 
the nation of Korea was desperate for autonomy, freedom, and independence. 
This desperation created a psychological and rhetorical need met by the skillfully 
crafted and communicated ideology of self-reliance, known as Juche (Force 5). Its 
primary focus was on resilient independence and hyper-nationalism, which in 
Kim’s speech was portrayed by reconstructing the Korean people as able 
revolutionary visionaries fighting against the tangible enemy of imperialism. The 
protagonist, or hero, is the workers and peasants – the proletariat – while the 
villains are Japan and the United States. If this vision of past revolutionary 
visionary Koreans were adopted and pursued in the present, then the future 
would lead to a peaceful communist revolution in South Korea. South Korea 
would then expel the American occupiers and rush headlong to join the socialist 
construction of North Korea. The attraction to the North would be higher living 
standards, strong economy, beautifully rebuilt cities, and freedoms.  
4.) Ask and Answer Specific Questions Relating to the Elements of the Dramas 
Thus far we have examined Kim Jong Il’s 1955 seminal speech of Juche 
using fantasy theme analysis, uncovered the heroes, villains, and several fantasy 
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themes within the speech that constitute the core of the Juche idea. To conclude 
this chapter, I will revisit some of the questions raised earlier in the chapter.  
Who are the dramatis personae? They are the Korean people. The Korean 
revolution is a purely Korean one; it is distinguished from the worldwide 
communist revolution promoted by Stalin and is specifically differentiated from 
Maoism. 
How does the fantasy theme work to attract the unconverted? As seen 
earlier, Kim Il Sung is establishing a fantasy theme that will inspire the South 
Koreans to rush to join the Korean socialist construction based on the high 
standards of living and the rebuilding of the nation’s infrastructure, and the 
freedoms and liberties held by North Korean citizens. The South’s yearning for a 
great nation, and seeing a great nation to the North, will bring about a peaceful 
reunification.  
Who are the heroes and the villains? Korea is the hero, portrayed 
historically in the rhetorical vision as freedom fighters of a revolutionary 
mindset, while Japan and America are the villains. Kim Il Sung makes it evident 
that his rhetorical vision, Juche, is staunchly anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist. 
How are the members of the rhetorical community characterized? The 
heroes, the members of the rhetorical vision, are portrayed as able revolutionary 
visionaries fighting against the tangible enemy of imperialism. The protagonist, 
or hero, is the workers and peasants, the proletariat. 
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V. Post Cold War Juche: The People Serve the Vision 
Introduction to Kim Jong Il’s “Let Us Prepare the Young People as Thoroughly 
Reliable Successors to the Revolutionary Cause of Juche” 
For the sake of congruity, this chapter will mirror the previous chapter, by 
performing a similar analysis of a speech by Kim Il Sung’s son, protégé, and 
replacement dictator, Kim Jong Il, also using fantasy theme analysis. In the next 
chapter the two analyses will be compared and the contradistinctions in ideology 
will be parsed out and summarized. In the current chapter the text in question, 
Kim Il Jong’s 1990 speech “Let Us Prepare the Young People as Thoroughly 
Reliable Successors to the Revolutionary Cause of Juche,” will be analyzed to 
extrapolate the true nature of “modern” Juche. 
The analysis of a second speech is necessary because in the 1970s Juche 
underwent a monumental change. Under the leadership of Kim Jong Il, whom 
Kim Il Sung gave increasing power leading up to the decade of the 1970s. It was 
during this time that the cult of personality, now widely known, began to develop. 
It is also the time that Juche gained incredible prominence as a national-
ideology.20 The transformation can be summarized by saying the Juche idea 
changed dramatically from a Marxist-Leninist based ideology into a rudimentary 
theocracy (Hale 283). This chapter will make progress on the work of explaining 
the evolution of the Juche idea. The evolution of Juche is not well documented in 
                                                
20 This was confirmed by research done at the South Korean national library by a friend of the 
author, Mr. Lee, while in Seoul for a conference on North Korea and Christianity. A fuller 
explanation of his findings are found in the Korean language handbook The New Analysis on the 
Forming and Transformation of the Juche Idea, published by the Reunification Research 
Institution, located in Seoul, South Korea.  
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English language literature, but is covered briefly by Christopher Hale’s 2002 
article, “Multifunctional Juche: A Study of the Changing Dynamic Between Juche 
and the State Constitution in North Korea.”21 
The content of the speech deals with patriotic and Juche education of the 
youth, which parallels with Kim Il Sung’s 1955 speech dealing with the 
establishment of the Juche idea. The major premise of both speeches is quite 
similar: the establishment of the Juche idea in the minds of North Koreans in 
1955 in the nation at large and in 1990 in the youth and children. This speech was 
given on the 44th22 anniversary of the inception of the League of Socialist 
Working Youth (LSWY),23 an organization created by the Korean Worker’s Party, 
and deals with – as the speech title suggests – the ideological education of the 
youth. In addition to this theme, a very clear additional theme becomes almost 
immediately apparent in the analysis of this speech, which is seen first emerging 
in the opening section: 
The LSWY is a single, political organization of the masses of young 
people in our country which educates them in a revolutionary 
manner so that they are rallied closely around the Party and are 
actively organized and mobilized for the implementation of the 
Party’s policies. (Kim Chong-Il24 1) 
                                                
21 Korean language literature on the evolution and historicity of Juche is widely available, but very 
seldom translated into English.  
22 The League of Socialist Working Youth was incepted January 17, 1946. 
23 The LSWY was renamed in 2006 and is now the “Kim Il Sung Socialist Youth League” 
(“History”). 
24 Kim Chong-Il is the spelling of Kim Jong Il in the text used for this analysis. See Works 
Consulted. 
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As evidenced in Chapter 3, the first step in performing a FTA is to 
establish that fantasy themes have, in fact, chained out by describing the 
narratives that constitute a fantasy theme. In spite of the fact that Juche is a 
lifestyle rhetorical vision, which is still virtually universally accepted in the DPRK 
today2526, the chaining out will be re-established for the analysis of the second 
speech. Much of the evidence of Juche being accepted as a lifestyle rhetorical 
vision discussed in the analysis of the previous speech applies here as well. 
Rather than repeat that discussion, I will simply establish that the past-future 
dialectic of the speech, that Bormann says is necessary, does in fact exist in this 
speech while describing the narratives that chain out from Kim Jong Il’s 1990 
speech.  
Once the first step of establishing the past-future dialectic has been 
completed the analysis will follow the remaining steps as outlined in the 
methodology chapter. Second, look for patterns of characterization and of setting. 
Third, reconstruct the rhetorical vision, and finally, ask and answer specific 
questions relating to the elements of the dramas. The questions asked in this 
chapter will be the same used in the previous chapter, Who are the dramatis 
personae? Who are the heroes and villains? How are the members of the 
rhetorical community characterized? How does the fantasy theme work to attract 
the unconverted? 
                                                
25 According to Bradley K. Martin in the late 1950s “Most ordinary North Koreans, however, did 
not have direct knowledge of Japan and other outside countries, and they knew their own living 
standards had improved after the advent of communist rule. Thus, Chong told me, they were 
inclined to believe Kim Il-Sung’s boast of having unfolded a paradise” (104). The information 
control present at that time has changed only negligibly and the access to outside information can 
be assumed to be the same today as in 1959 (Song).  
26 I use the term “virtually” because there is a large population of political dissidents who have 
either been executed or sent to labor/reeducation camps. However, in the general population the 
legitimacy of Juche, is still widely accepted.  
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Analysis 
1.) Discover and Describe the Narrative the Chained Out 
As mentioned in the previous chapter and in the literature review, for a 
fantasy theme to exist it must be concerned with either the past or the future. The 
beginnings of fantasy themes evident in this text emerge very early in the speech, 
in the third paragraph. Kim Jong Il conveys and imparts the importance of the 
history of the League of Socialist Working Youth: “The LSWY has grown from 
deep, historical roots” (Kim Chong-Il 1). By looking back at the inception of the 
LSWY Kim Jong Il attempts to foster a communally congruent memory of the 
organization. Bormann tells us that fantasy themes begin to emerge when groups 
become “excited” (Bormann, “Social” 399). To this end, Kim Jong Il creates in the 
minds of his audience a connection between the “Great Leader,” Kim Il Sung, and 
his exploits to the history of the LSWY. In a sense, Kim Jong Il is exciting his 
audience about the past in two facets, by orally memorializing Kim Il Sung, who 
held incredible popularity at that time,27 and the LSWY simultaneously. Kim 
Jong Il extrapolates the concept of the “deep historical roots” of the LSWY:  
The great leader initiated the revolutionary youth movement 
of our country long ago, trained hardcore elements for the 
revolutionary youth organization in the flames of the anti-Japanese 
revolutionary struggle and established brilliant traditions for the 
youth movement in our country.” 
                                                
27 Kim Il Sung died in 1994, the year that Kim Jong Il took control of the DPRK. At the time of this 
speech Kim Il Sung was still the functioning leader of the nation. 
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On the basis of his own valuable achievements and 
experiences in the youth movement gained during the anti-
Japanese revolutionary struggle, the great leader founded the 
Democratic Youth League, a mass organization for young people 
from all walks of life, immediately after liberation and firmly united 
the young people into a single, political force. (Kim Chong-Il 1) 
Mention of Kim Il Sung is used, by Kim Jong Il, as an attempt to extend 
the original fantasy theme/lifestyle rhetorical vision of the 1950s by connecting 
Kim Il Sung to the League of Socialist Working Youth during the original 
revolution, which was based on the Korean people.  
Similar to Kim Il Sung speaking 45 years earlier, Kim Jong Il – after 
looking backwards – looks ahead. In his transition to looking forward he states 
that the LSWY is in a good spot, ideologically speaking, and that their “spiritual 
qualities” are “very sound.” Specifically he points to actual (albeit ambiguous) 
evidence: “Our young people [. . .] are fighting with devotion to the fore in 
difficult and hard undertakings on all fronts of socialist construction, holding 
firm to the Party’s lines and policies” (Kim Chong-Il 1, 2). Kim Jong Il continues: 
“[In] many countries young people are cause of anxiety,” however, “in our 
country the youth are the pillars of the revolution [. . .] We should take pride in 
the excellent training of the youth so far” (Kim Chong-Il 2).  
Looking forward, Kim Jong Il emphasizes that the youth are the “future 
national cadres who will take over the revolution,” concluding that resting in 
status quo of Juche will be unsatisfactory (Kim Chong-Il 12). The solution is to 
“intensify their ideological education,” or else:  
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Young people may be affected by bourgeois ideas and lapse into an 
idle and slack, decadent and corrupt way of life, disliking work and 
becoming lazy. Then, the youth cannot conduct the revolution and 
become the reliable successors to our revolution. (Kim Chong-Il 3) 
 The ideological education of the youth will be discussed below, in step two 
of the analysis of this text, in the discussion of patterns of characterization and 
settings. 
 To illustrate the fact that symbolic convergence did, in fact, occur I will 
now highlight four more examples in which Kim Jong Il looks into history, 
deconstructing and reconstructing historical Korean moments, and telescoping 
past exploits into future necessities for the purpose of creating excitement in the 
here and now of this 1990 speech. After these five examples I will look at general 
characterizations and patterns found throughout the speech.  
 First, future dictator Kim uses a potent metaphor again connecting Kim Il 
Sung to the LSWY and to the Korean people and their “revolutionary identity.” 
He tells his audience, the Senior Officials of the Central Committee, that the 
platitude-ridden anti-Japanese exploits of Kim Il Sung, the “Great Leader,” are 
the “historical roots and arteries of our revolution” (Kim Chong-Il 4). These 
roots, he says, are necessary for the youth to understand if they are to continue in 
the revolution.  
 the reconstruction seen in the second example looks backward, but 
presumably also applies to the present. Discussing education of class and 
imperialism, Kim Jong Il states that the youth of North Korea, up to this point, 
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have not “experienced the exploitation of landlords and capitalists but lived 
happily in the embrace of our Party” (Kim Chong-Il 5).  
Third, Kim Jong Il transitions from discussing class to sharing a moving 
tale of patriotism, which casts the Party as a magnanimous and unsparing. The 
following narrative discusses the story of three sets of infant triplets, who were 
reunited in their youth at an annual LSWY conference:  
The leader [Kim Il Sung] said, had the triplets not been born under 
our socialist system not all of them would have survived. A mother’s 
milk alone is not enough for a child to live, but thanks to the 
embrace of the Party and the advantageous socialist system the 
triplets grew up healthily without any worries and became proud 
soldiers. In fact the triplets grew up not by suckling their mothers 
but by drinking milk given them by the Party while living in 
incubators at the Pyongyang Maternity Hospital that is permeated 
with love [. . .] Our Party spares nothing for the younger generation. 
Our Party gives all that is best to the children. (Kim Chong-Il 7) 
The idea of the Party as “munificent” is an important idea, which will 
emerge more fully as I discuss the characterizations and in the comparison of the 
two speeches surveyed in this thesis. For now it will suffice that Kim Jong Il is 
creating excitement about the Party in order for to sustain the Party’s future. The 
fourth example of Kim Jong Il recreating the past is a relatively long discussion of 
Korean culture, highlighting Korean cultural pride:  
There is no nation like the Korean nation with its long history and 
brilliant culture as a single nation living in the same land from early 
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historical times [. . .] the Korean people form a resourceful nation 
that has a long history and brilliant culture. (Kim Chong-Il 8, 9) 
 Predictably, the purpose of this quote is to compare the past to what is 
coming next. After discussing the brilliant culture of Korea, Kim Jong Il tells his 
audience that the culture is at the “vanguard of the struggle to realize the 
independence of the popular masses, holding high the banner of the Juche idea 
under the leadership of the great leader and the great Party” (Kim Chong-Il 9).  
2.) Look for Patterns of Characterization and Setting 
Having presented evidence of symbolic convergence and the narratives of 
the fantasy theme, I will now move to the second step, examining the patterns 
and characterizations throughout the speech. This section will cover the 
characterization of the Korean Workers’ Party, the Korean people including the 
youth, and Imperialism as personified by the United States.  
 The Korean Workers Party is portrayed as “munificent,” as evidenced by 
the narrative concerning the sets of triplets nourished by the Party’s hospital; 
powerful, as evidenced by their direction of the construction of the revolution; 
and wise, as evidenced throughout the speech, particularly though the didactic – 
almost Aristotelian nature28 – of the following excerpt: “Young people are 
responsive to the new, like to follow positive examples, and are ambitious to win 
fame by doing something better than others” (Kim Chong-Il 11).   
Additionally, the epistemology of the party seems to be that all wisdom 
and knowledge comes from the “Great Leader”:  
                                                
28 I am referring to Book 2 of The Rhetoric, in which Aristotle outlines the distinctions in 
character between the youth, middle aged persons, and elders. 
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Today our nation is taking the lead in constructing a socialist 
paradise in which people can enjoy an independent and creative life 
to their hearts’ content, raising high the banner of the Juche idea, 
under the leadership of the Workers’ Party of Korea, holding in high 
esteem great Comrade Kim Il Sung, the sun of the nation, as their 
leader. (Kim Chong-Il 9) 
 The Party is characterized as powerful and as the director of the 
revolution, as seen throughout the speech in several statements dealing with the 
Party’s direction of the youth. For example, “Our Party has summoned young 
people to the construction of major projects, such as transforming nature and 
building monumental structures” (Kim Chong-Il 15). The structures in question 
include a national canal system, coal mines, regional railway systems, Kim Il 
Sung Stadium, and the Tower of the Juche Idea.  
 On the other hand, the Korean people are cast not as revolutionaries, but 
as agents of revolution. The task of the youth, the main subject of the speech, is to 
further the revolution. The obligatory “glorious” history of the Korean nation is 
not omitted from this speech; however, a close reading clearly reveals that the 
revolution is not of the youth – it is being forced upon them:  
It is necessary to instill the Juche idea thoroughly in young people [. 
. .] Principled and profound education in the Juche idea needs to be 
conducted among young people so that they will accept the Juche 
idea’s own revolutionary outlook on the world and live and work 
only as required by the Juche idea. (Kim Chong-Il 4, 5) 
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 Kim Jong Il outlines several reasons why the ideological education of the 
Korean youth must be increased. He says the result of the intensification of the 
ideological education of the youth will be for them: a.) To learn “infinite loyalty” 
to Kim Il Sung; b.) To learn “belief in the victory of the revolution;” c.) To learn 
“self-reliance and fortitude in surmounting all difficulties;” d.) To learn to execute 
“revolutionary tasks without fail;” e.) And to personify the revolution in their “life 
and work” (Kim Chong-Il 4).  
 Another de rigueur characterization is the United States, the “sworn 
enemy” of the DPRK. While not mentioned as often as in other speeches and 
DPRK propaganda, such as the North Korean official web-presence, the words 
are unmistakably clear:  
The US imperialists occupying south Korea forcing oppression and 
exploitation on the south Korean people through the exploiter class 
and reactionaries there [. . . ] [We must] ensure that the youth 
totally hate the exploiting class and its system and fight relentlessly 
against them. (Kim Chong-Il 5) 
 In addition to the negative description in the above quotation is the 
explicit labeling of the U.S. as having “corrupt characteristics” and being “wicked 
and cunning in nature.” To broaden Kim Jong Il’s characterization of 
imperialism29 there are no less than eight references to “anti-Japanese” exploits 
by Korea.  
                                                
29 Kim Jong Il is not referring to specifically Japanese or U.S. imperialism, rather, his use of 
imperialism here is broader, referring both to military and cultural invasion of North Korea by 
both Japan and the U.S.  
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 The settings in this speech, which are the last characterization to be 
addressed before reconstructing the rhetorical vision outlined by Kim Jong Il, are 
varied in scope and range from universities to factories to rural massive civil 
engineering projects. The pattern that emerges within each described setting is 
that the action happening in each instance is cast in the light of a “vanguard” 
construction of socialism while urging for the ultimate goal of “socialist victory,” 
after which the Party seems to be striving – but which is left undefined.  
3.) Reconstruct the Rhetorical Vision 
With the narratives described and the patterns of characterization 
discussed the third step, reconstructing the rhetorical vision, can be done. 
Leaving the victory of socialist construction undefined fits the overall rhetorical 
vision of Kim Jong Il’s Juche perfectly. Ernest Bormann writes that a fantasy 
theme analysis must fulfill a psychological or rhetorical need (Bormann, Force 5). 
The fantasy theme that emerges in this speech meets a psychological need in the 
Korean people; however, the psychological need that is being met is one and the 
same as the need for revolution created by the Party – through its power 
directing the revolution.  
Kim Jong Il does not try to disguise the purpose of the LSWY. The theme 
that emerges is that the LSWY exists for the purpose of supporting and upholding 
the preeminence of the Party. In fact, it appears, from the quote above, that the 
LSWY is an explicit propaganda machine whose sole purpose is to implement the 
will of the Party. This is similar to the idea in religions, such as Buddhism30, 
                                                
30 I mention Buddhism specifically because of its focus on education, and the subsequent 
knowledge acquired, as a means of achieving the Four Noble Truths and the Eightfold Path. 
Buddhism’s view of education is similar to the constructivist theory of learning, in which the 
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which is strongly reliant on educating followers to devote their lives to a divine 
cause. Kim Jong Il supports this idea when he says that the anti-Japanese 
revolutionary guerillas who expelled the Japanese from the Korean peninsula, 
“fought to the last for the liberation of the country with an unshakable conviction 
in the victory of the Korean revolution, believing in and following the leader 
alone.31 3233 
The need, which is being met by the Korean Worker’s Party, is based on 
the creation of a need that fits the recurring theme of “rallying around” a 
particular created entity, namely, the “Party.” In large part, the revolution 
discussed in this 1990 speech – and in North Korea today – is an artificial 
construct. By 1990 the cold war had ended, globalization was on the brink of 
emerging as the next major world stage as the imperial age was being ushered, 
sometimes quietly and sometimes not, into the history books (Friedman, The 
World is Flat). Further, the most recent international incident involving the 
DPRK, the Pueblo incident of 196834, was by the time of this speech at least a 
generation removed. The modern revolution of North Korea, based on the Juche 
idea, is a faux-revolution.  
                                                                                                                                            
student is the center of process. “Learning for learning-sake” is one of the goals of education from 
a Buddhist perspective, “it is the student’s mind which is most important” (Bright). 
31 Emphasis added. 
32 Noteworthy here is the intentional failure to mention the Allied forces, who during WWII were 
also partially responsible for the expulsion of the Japanese from the Korean peninsula following 
the unconditional surrender of Japan in September of 1945. 
33 It is notable here to see the words “the leader alone.” While Kim Il Sung was, at the time the 
speech is given, a dictator with absolute authority over the DPRK and the Korean people, he did 
not consolidate absolute power until the 1960s. 
34 The capture of the USS Pueblo and the detainment of 82 U.S. navy personnel nearly triggered a 
second leg of the Korean War. In fact, only a $100 million promise of economic aid from the 
United States prevented the South from staging a unilateral invasion (Martin 129).  
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Kim Jong Il outlines this faux-revolution. For example, he tells his 
audience, “In the world there still remain exploiting classes, and a fierce class 
struggle is taking place between working classes and exploiting classes, socialism 
and capitalism.” This antiquated bourgeois vs. proletariat thinking, which does 
not fit the international culture of the 1990s, is an example of the revolution 
being created. The Kims (Il Sung and Jong Il) are using this lifestyle rhetorical 
vision to keep the Korean people stuck, ideologically, in the 1960s.  
Generally, the concept of the Party cyclically creating and fulfilling a 
rhetorical/psychological need is similar to a child who watches a Saturday 
morning television show only to see, and consequently desire, an advertisement 
for a new toy. Upon seeing the advertisement the child develops a self-perceived 
need for the toy. Of course, the toy manufacturer, who sponsored the stimulating 
commercial, can meet said satisfaction35. 
In Juche, as evident by this speech and other avenues, the Party plays the 
role of the toy manufacturer; developing the revolution and selling it to the 
nation, which creates a perceived psychological need in the Korean people, 
which, in turn, the Party meets by directing the Korean people in their roles in 
the revolution. The end result of this cyclical process is that the Party is 
empowered over the lives of North Koreans. In this speech Kim Jong Il is 
speaking in order to gain control over the youth – whom he recognizes as 
important in the party: 
                                                
35 Monroe’s Motivated Sequence is another apt description of this phenomena, as is any basic 
form of advertising. 
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The young people are the successors to the revolution. How they are 
brought up is a serious matter with a direct bearing on the 
prospects for the revolution and the future of the nation [. . .] 
Historical experience shows that when young people are not trained 
well it is possible to ruin the revolutionary achievements made 
during a long and arduous struggle and to fail in the work of 
promoting and completing the revolutionary cause pioneered by the 
leader. (Kim Chong-Il 2) 
In short, the rhetorical vision is one of the Korean people, embodied by the 
youth in this speech, acting as agents of the revolution on behalf of the wise, 
historically sound, and magnanimously generous Party. This appeal is necessary, 
as the urgency of the original nature of the revolution following the Korean War 
had subsided by the time Kim Jong Il gave this address. The Juche idea at the 
juncture that this speech was given was merely a power-holding device. The 
Party’s legitimacy was upheld by reconstituting the history of the Party through 
telescoping the original revolution and expulsion of the Japanese after WWII in 
1945 to the Party’s work in 1990 (Kim Chong-Il 1). 
One of the ways in which Kim Jong Il increased the Party’s power, and 
affirmed its power over the youth in the speech, is by using the power of 
language. Kim Jong Il’s rhetorical vision blurs any contradistinction between the 
Korean nation and the Korean nation’s government; that is, he proposes that they 
are to be thought of as one entity. His goal is for North Koreans to see the Korean 
Workers’ Party as a synonym for the Korean nation.  
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 Kim Jong Il said, of the revolution, showing that this revolution is not 
meant to aid the Korean people, but the Party: “When young people are fully 
armed with the spirit of the anti-Japanese revolutionary fighters they will be able 
to defend and safeguard the Party and the leader staunchly and to fight for the 
completion of the revolutionary cause of Juche” (Kim Chong-Il 4). There is a 
clear hierarchy in this passage, where the importance of the Korean nation has 
been replaced with the Korean Workers Party and the revolution has been 
changed from serving the people to “safeguarding” the Party, and the “Great 
Leader.”  
Had Kim Jong Il been speaking in 1955 rather than 1990, “to defend and 
safeguard the Party and leader” would read “to defend and safeguard the Korean 
nation.” By re-visioning the past in order to create a vision for the future the 
Korean nation has been brought down to the level of the Party and its “Great 
Leader,” Kim Il Sung.  
Further, the mention of “infinite devotion to the leader” in Kim Jong Il’s 
speech points to the ascension of Kim Il Sung as being symbolically equal to the 
Juche idea, which is in turn symbolic of the Korean Revolution, which is symbolic 
of the Korean people, who are, by nature of the reverence of history in their 
culture, deeply proud of their 5000 year homogenous history. The result, then, is 
that Kim Il Sung is seen, when historically reconstructed by Kim Jong Il, as a 
savior of the Korean people.  
4.) Ask and Answer Specific Questions Relating to the Elements of the Dramas 
Finally, questions concerning the dramas can be asked. 
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Who are the dramatis personae? There are two sets of primary characters 
in Kim Jong Il’s rhetorical vision, the Korean Workers Party and the League of 
Socialist Working Youth. These two groups represent the power of Kim Il Sung 
(and Kim Jong Il by relation) as director of the revolution and the Korean people 
as agents of the revolution, respectively.  
How does the fantasy theme work to attract the unconverted? Due to the 
long period between the inception of Juche and the delivery of this speech the 
unconverted have presumably had enough time to decide their stance towards 
Juche. However, increasing the fierceness of devotion of the youth can be 
substituted for “attracting the unconverted.” In this sense, the “unconverted” are 
brought on board by promising them a role in fighting, patriotically, for the 
nation and the “Great Leader,” Kim Il Sung, by dedicating their youth to 
industrial construction. Of course, the Korean Workers Party must construct the 
revolution; however, the end goal of the revolution – if it can be completed – is a 
socialist utopia, similar to Christianity’s heaven or Buddhism’s nirvana. 
Who are the heroes and the villains? The hero, primarily, is Kim Il Sung, 
who is historically recast as being integrally important in the founding of the 
LSWY and the KWP, and as a fearless and wise leader. Imperialism, generally, is 
cast as the villain. With Japan taking partial blame, but America being overtly 
characterized as innately corrupt and wicked.  
How are the members of the rhetorical community characterized? The 
rhetorical community is the Korean people, represented by the LSWY. Their 
characterization is as an ideologically correct group of labor-loving youth who are 
susceptible to corruption and complacency due to the sheltered and utopist 
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upbringing. They are a group in need of further ideological strengthening and 
education. This education is necessary because they haven’t seen the evils of 
capitalism or an oppressing class dominated society. 
It is evident from looking at Kim Jong Il’s 1990 speech “Let Us Prepare the 
Young People as Thoroughly Reliable Successors to the Revolutionary Cause of 
Juche” that Juche in its modern form has changed dramatically from the original 
vision presented by Kim Il Sung’s 1955 speech, “On Eliminating Dogmatism and 
Formalism and Establishing Juche in Ideological Work.” Modern Juche seems to 
be legitimized not on the basis of meeting a specific rhetorical or psychological 
need, but rather being part of a cyclical process in which the Party creates a 
perceived need in the minds of the Korean people based on a faux-revolution in 
which the United States is cast as a murderous villain and illegitimate occupier of 
South Korea bent on conquest and domination of North Korea as well. Based on 
this scenario the Juche idea – in this thesis seen as a lifestyle rhetorical vision – is 
used to fulfill the perceived need in the Korean people by presenting to them a 
specific Party-assigned role in the revolution. This, in turn, gives power and 
legitimacy to the Party, which appears to be the motivation for sustaining this 
particular lifestyle rhetorical vision, which – as seen in the introduction to Juche 
in chapter 3 – has clearly failed to meet the tangible needs of the people. 
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VI. Discussion: The Rhetorical Visions Compared 
The transformation of the nature of Juche into a cyclical power-wielding 
tool can be better understood by examining three specific aspects of the change 
which occurred between 1955 and 1990: North Korea’s focus on rebuilding, 
attitude towards reunification, and stance towards imperialism.  
The legitimacy of the rhetorical vision, as understood by Juche’s goals and 
purpose, has changed. Original Juche was born out of a legitimate need of a 
homogenous culture to strive to gain independence after three consecutive 
devastating historical events: the occupation of the Korean peninsula by Japan, 
World War II, and the Korean War. The Juche idea was used as a tool by Kim Il 
Sung to meet this very pertinent need, and his vision was met with such great 
success it grew into a lifestyle rhetorical vision throughout North Korea.  
There are two distinct purposes that set the two rhetorical visions (original 
Juche and modern Juche) apart. In addition to the historical background of 
original Juche being born from a realistic need and modern Juche being 
maintained under a premise of deceit, the purpose of the Juche ideology has 
changed. The stated purpose has not wavered, that is, from 1955 to 1990 self-
reliance has been the official justification for the rhetorical vision; however, the 
pragmatic application and end goal has changed. There were three primary goals 
of Juche outlined in the seminal speech of the Juche idea in 1955: first, the 
rebuilding of the nation, since the United Nations “scorched earth” retreat left 
North Korea’s infrastructure in ruins and only one building still standing in the 
city of Pyongyang; and second, the reunification of the Korean people. This 
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second goal can be said to have two “sub goals,” the autonomous governance of 
Koreans by Koreans which would be no small feat given their history and the 
reunification of North Korea and South Korea; the third goal is to destroy the 
sworn enemy of the United States.  
 Of these three goals, the rebuilding of the North Korean infrastructure was 
achieved within 30 years. As seen in the image of Pyongyang in chapter 4 it is 
now a very large city,36 and as evidenced in Kim Jong Il’s 1990 speech since the 
Korean War much of the infrastructure has been rebuilt, including railways, 
chemical factories, stadiums, and monuments. The original Juche idea was 
successful in achieving the goal of rebuilding.  
On the other hand, under the guise of modern Juche, the rebuilding of the 
infrastructure has continued without clear economic benefit. By 1990 the 
physical devastation left by the Korean War had been overcome through the 
previous four decades’ reconstruction of the infrastructure. Kim Jong Il’s 
following claim seems to point towards a motivation of building and 
advancement for the sake of advancement:  
In the 1990’s we must complete many projects, including large 
power station, the second state of the Sunchon Vinalon Complex, 
the Sariwon Potassic Fertilizer Complex, an up-to-date steel plant 
with a 2,000,000-ton annual capacity, 50,000 houses in 
                                                
36 Although the economy today is virtually ground to a halt from the 1960s through the 1980s 
North Korea was one of the most industrially advanced nations in Asia. Martin writes of the 
advancement referring to the period of 1946 - 1960, “Pyongyang took effective advantage of the 
country’s high degree of centralization, its compact economy and an unusual lack of corruption 
and mismanagement. Its success “makes North Korea’s model unique among the world’s many 
aid-receiving aspirants of development,” said a study published by a conservative American think 
tank” (Martin 97). 
Warner  77 
Pyongyang, the reclamation of tidal lands on the west coast, 
railways and motorways. (Let us 16).  
The motivation behind this building is to complete an undefined “socialist 
victory.” It is a clear manifestation of the cyclical nature of the modern Juche 
idea, in which the leader, here Kim Jong Il representing the Party, dictates the 
need for work to be done to complete a revolution that is not needed, for the 
purpose of maintaining power over the nation-state of the DPRK. 
Building projects and the utilization of youth “shock brigades” on 
“construction sites” is the means to the end of a victory of socialist revolution, 
however, reunification, according to the rhetorical vision and fantasy themes cast 
by Kim Jong Il is not. Reunification is not mentioned in Kim Jong Il’s 1990 
speech; in fact the only mention of South Korea by Kim Jong Il is as follows:  
The US imperialists occupying south Korea are forcing oppression 
and exploitation on the south Korean people through the exploiter 
class and reactionaries there [. . .] Education in the sense of class 
should be conducted effectively among young people, using 
material about the atrocities perpetrated by the US and Japanese 
imperialists in their aggression in our country and clear material 
showing the present oppression and exploitation of the people in 
south Korea by the puppet clique and exploiting class there. 
The glaring omission of educating the youth on, as Kim Il Sung said, the 
“prospects of reunification” is not inconsequential. When taken in the context of 
the thoroughness of Kim Jong Il in explaining which areas of ideological 
education need to be focused on, the lack of mention of reunification is clear. 
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According to Kim Jong Il the areas that ideological education needs to address 
include learning the spirit of anti-Japanese revolutionary fighters and the spirit 
of the revolution, a sense of hate towards landlords and the bourgeois exploiting 
classes represented by American imperialism, a devout focus on patriotism 
defined as loving the fatherland and loving the Party, and a sense of Korean pride 
in the resourcefulness and history of the nation as personified by Kim Il Sung and 
the Juche idea. The idea of reunification is omitted. 
The second goal, that of unity, was partially reached by Kim Il Sung and 
the original Juche idea. That is, the North emerged as a Korean-governed nation-
state. The goal of reunification remained aloof, however. The unity within the 
North only left a stronger desire to reunite with the South. The desire for one 
Korean nation was so strong in the North that Kim Il Sung sparked a vicious and 
deadly civil war. Even after the Korean War the confidence and optimism was so 
high that Kim Il Sung recommended, in 1955, training educational forces to 
inculcate South Koreans with the Juche idea. Clearly, the North at that time 
thought that unification was imminent in the near-term. 
The third goal, destroying the U.S., North Korea’s sworn enemy, also 
remained aloof. America’s destruction, through, has not remained a priority in 
modern Juche. Examining, through the two texts analyzed here, North Korea’s 
treatment of imperialism, Japan, and the United States, substantiates this. Anti-
imperialism is a pervasive theme throughout North Korean literature; however, 
the scope and severity of said treatment varies dramatically between Kim Il 
Sung’s 1955 speech and Kim Jong Il speaking 45 years later. There is a small 
change of the focus being on the enemy of Japan in 1955, to the focus being on 
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the United States in 1990. This is due to the North’s perception of Japanese and 
American “interference” in Korean issues. Japan has not disturbed Korea since 
the end of WWII. However, since 1945 America has engaged in a deadly war with 
the North and “occupied” the South continually since the North invaded the 
South and began the Korean War. A more substantial change than the focus 
moving from Japan to the United States is the severity of animosity towards the 
United States. Kim Jong Il had nothing nice to say about the U.S. in 1990:  
The imperialists, particularly the US imperialists, are stepping up 
their vicious reactionary propaganda against socialism to an 
unprecedented degree in an effort to disarm people in socialist 
countries ideologically, and so undermine socialism from within. 
The US imperialists occupying south Korea are forcing oppression 
and exploitation on the south Korean people through the exploiter 
class and reactionaries there. (Kim Chong-Il 5) 
He continues after this excerpt and discusses the wickedness of US 
imperialism and instructs his audience about the paramount importance of 
teaching the youth of the DPRK to hate America. While extreme, and potentially 
unsettling to American citizens, when taken in hand with the historical view of 
America North Korea held in 1955, Kim Jong Il’s casting of the Juche lifestyle 
rhetorical vision can be understood as “mere rhetoric.” That is, it seems 
practically harmless when contrasted with Kim Il Sung threatening the U.S. with 
a “big war” (Kim Il Sung 146). Kim Il Sung, who was at the forefront of the 
Korean War, and in fact responsible for the decision to invade South Korea, 
wanted to cause physical destruction to the American government. Kim Jong Il 
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seems to be paying lip service to the idea of America as “sworn enemy,” 
discussing hate and atrocities, but not threatening or implying any tangible 
action to be taken against the U.S. or Japan. While in 1955 war was an option 
verbally confirmed by Kim Il Sung with no pretense or stipulations.  
Taken together, these goals represent the pragmatic purpose of Juche. 
Their purpose was to serve the Korean people, each end goal was destined and 
created for the betterment and well-being of the Korean people, albeit not all 
South Koreans would agree that imminent reunification with the North under the 
guise of Juche is in their best interest. The Korean People are implicitly 
disenfranchised while the Party is elevated. 
A final change, not related to the goals and purpose of Juche is that of 
utopian paradise. Kim Jong Il proposes that without “proper revolutionary and 
class education” the youth will not be able to fight against the ”exploiting class” or 
for the “revolutionary cause” since up to this point the youth of North Korea have 
lived “happily” and without the “exploitation of landlords and capitalists.” Kim 
Jong Il is asserting that the children of the DPRK live, compared to South Korea, 
in a virtual utopia. In one sense, he is continuing the vision of rebuilding North 
Korea into a utopia, but his implication that it has already happened, as Kim Il 
Sung predicted in 1955. The difference here is Kim Il Sung forecasting a Korean 
socialist utopia in 1955, which his son declared to exist by 1990. In another sense, 
which is much closer to reality, the children of the DPRK live in the most closed 
and centrally controlled society in modern times.  
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VII. Conclusion 
Summary and Current Ramifications 
This thesis has outlined the fantasy themes in two major speeches in North 
Korean political history. The first speech, given by Kim Il Sung in 1955, was the 
seminal speech at the inception of the Juche idea in North Korea. The analysis of 
this speech revealed a lifestyle rhetorical vision that served the Korean people 
and a legitimate psychological need. The second analyzed speech, given by Kim 
Jong Il in 1990, found that the rhetorical vision still remained; however, it had 
changed from a legitimately functioning ideology realized in the success of the 
original vision to one of continual re-envisioning of “revolutionary socialist 
victory.” Simply put, the vision has evolved into a power-wielding device used by 
the Korean Workers’ Party to maintain its monopoly of control on North Korea.  
With Pyongyang being rebuilt and the economy becoming re-established 
throughout the decades of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s and a strong heavy-
industry based infrastructure developing, the great need for a drastic and 
dramatic lifestyle rhetorical vision had all but vanished by the time Kim Jong Il 
gave his 1990 address. The need for the rhetorical vision of modern Juche to be 
sustained through a faux-revolution created by the Party is even more necessary 
now than in the 1990s. Since Kim Jong Il delivered the speech in question the 
North Korean economy has been receding up to 5 percent a year. Today, after 
nearly two decades of recession the economy is beyond crisis mode, it has 
virtually ceased to function. In sum, without a revolution to wage and without an 
enemy to defend against the party would have neither purpose nor power.  
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This thesis’ understanding of Juche as a power-wielding tool used by the 
Korean Workers Party can be applied to several aspects of life in North Korea 
today. Information control, for example, as said by Wonsook Song, is “of the 
Party, by the Party, for the Party,” and is very effective in controlling the 
information available to the citizens of North Korea37. It is necessary to keep 
outside information on the reality of life in other countries, even other 
communist countries such as China, from the citizens of the DPRK, since seeing 
the disparity would lead to a lack of belief in Juche.  
Due to severe information control in North Korea the reality of South 
Korean’s living standards and vibrant economy, which are both exceptional by 
global standards, is unknown. Thus, Kim Jong Il is able to paint a picture of 
South Koreans as huddling and hiding from an occupying military force, not the 
attitude and atmosphere of collaboration between South Korea and the United 
States which reflects the current situation. The Kims’ deceiving of North Koreans 
is not a new phenomenon. During the Korean war, “Most believed the North had 
been the target of a Southern and U.S. invasion, an invasion that the North 
Korean People’s Army had turned back heroically. Pyongyang’s phony unification 
appeal just before the attack had fooled Kim’s own people” (Martin 73).  
 Additionally, the power-wielding function of modern Juche ideology is a 
partial explanation of the percentage of the GDP the DPRK spends on military 
endeavors, which stands at over 30%. The function is to portray to the North 
                                                
37 It should also be noted that Kim Il Sung, and presumably his son, are not privy to reliable 
intelligence. According to Katsumi Sato, editor of Gendai Korea one of Kim Il-Sung’s delegates 
gave a favorable report of conditions in South Korea in 1972 and was promptly sent to a camp for 
ideological reeducation. Sato says, “”The point is, everybody has seen this sort of thing happen, 
and therefore nobody working for Kim and his son will tell them the truth” (Martin 154, 794).  
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Korean people the legitimacy of key tenets of Juche, such as imminent attack by 
the “sworn enemy” of the U.S. By possessing an army that stands at over 1 million 
men, and the recent development and testing of nuclear weapons38 Kim Jong Il 
and the Korean Workers Party demonstrate to the Korean people that a.) they are 
defended against their enemies and b.) their enemies do, in fact, exist. It is, based 
on the conclusions of this thesis, that the DPRK’s nuclear weapons are neither for 
use on foreign soil nor for international intimidation. Rather, it is a show of 
might by the Korean Workers’ Party to show its own people, the current 
adherents of the Juche idea, that Juche is a functioning and successful ideology. 
North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons confirms to the  North 
Koreans that the Juche idea and its accompanying revolution are still necessary 
and pertinent. Since, logically, if North Korea possesses nuclear weapons as a 
deterrent then the deterred threat must be real. Rather than a threat, though, 
their nuclear weapons serve only as confirmation to the Korean people that they 
do, in fact, live in a utopian heaven on earth. This approach to understanding 
North Korea’s military presences can be used to explain both sides of the North-
South divide in the current day, as well as in the future. For example, in March of 
2008 the Korean Central News Agency told South Korea, “Everything will be in 
ashes, not just a sea of fire, if our advanced pre-emptive strike once begins.” This 
                                                
38 In addition to nuclear weapons North Korea also posses biological weapons. In 2002 North 
Korea’s biological weapons program was described as, “biotechnology infrastructure, capable of 
producing infectious agents, toxins, and other crude biological weapons. It likely has the 
capability to produce sufficient quantities of biological agents for military purposes within weeks 
of deciding to do so, and has a variety of means at its disposal for delivering these deadly 
weapons” (“Biological Weapons Overview”). 
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stronger than usual remark3940is in response to South Korean’s newly elected 
President’s hard-line stance.41 The contrast between Seoul’s reactions to these 
statements is marked. In 1994 Seoul was visibly alarmed when North Korea made 
similar threats, evidenced by citizens stocking up on food; however, in 2008 
Seoul seemed demonstrably unperturbed (Sang-Hun, “North Korea Says”). This 
evidence supports the point that North Korea’s grandiloquence is unimpressive 
to the South. in light of the South’s de facto ignoring of the DPRK’s threats they 
can be understood to be fustian, the intended audience of inflammatory remarks 
made by the Korea Central News Agency is the North Korea people for the 
purpose of intentional deception to mask the failures of the Juche ideology. A 
final example of this idea is summarized by Thom Shanker, speaking of the U.S. 
military’s proposal to bring troops’ spouses and family with them on tours of duty 
in South Korea:  
It would reverse decades of policy for South Korea, recognizing that 
an attack from the North has become unlikely given the enduring 
                                                
39 This is a reference to the infamous 1994 North Korean threat to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire” 
when the North was first discovered by the popular press and Western media to be developing 
nuclear weapons (Sang-Hun, “North Korea Says”). 
40 A few days after North Korea threatened to destroy Seoul President Lee Myung-Bak was 
insulted directly, the first time a Southern president had been directly insulted in 8 years (Sang-
Hun, “North Korea Attacks”). The previous president, Roh Moo-hyun, had continued to 
implement a “Sunshine Policy” which had been implemented by his predecessor, Kim Dae-jung. 
The policies overt goals were political cooperation, however a widely held conception in the South 
is that reunification will be possible only after economic equality between the DPRK and the ROK 
has been realized.  
41 President Lee Myung-Bak was elected December 19, 2007 on a conservative platform which 
included cutting economic and humanitarian aid to North Korea until progress in areas of human 
rights and nuclear non-proliferation are addressed by the Korean Workers Party and Kim Jong Il 
(Sang-Hun, “South”) Also notable is that Lee Myung-Bak’s platform was based largely on 
domestic issues, including real-estate and the general economy. Further, he defeated Park Geun-
hee, daughter of former Republic of Korea Geeral and leader of South Korea until his 
assassination in 1979, in the Grand National Party’s competition for presidential candidate 
(Onishi). 
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American presence as a deterrent and the growth in size and 
sophistication of the South Korean armed forces. 
Perhaps one of the reasons North Korea’s stance towards America has 
changed from one of necessary destruction to mere verbal abuse is that Juche 
must not fail. If Juche is to fail, the Party will fail. Failure of the Party would 
destroy the entirety of the power structure of the central government. The Party, 
it seems, is so hell-bent on maintaining power and control in North Korea that it 
will not risk the Juche idea being compromised in any way, including 
international war. The need to sustain this ideology outweighs the risk of 
infiltration of outside information that would be present in the chaos of war.  
Recently the New York Philharmonic played a monumentally 
groundbreaking concert in Pyongyang. The New York Times reported that it was 
the largest contingency of Americas to visit North Korea since the end of the 
Korean War. There has been speculation surrounding this unprecedented event 
of North Korea opening up its economy; similar to the economic reforms China 
and Vietnam have taken recently. However, North Korea has a long history of 
making promises to Western agencies and nations in return for economic and 
humanitarian assistance and breaking those promises upon receipt of aid. Based 
on the analysis of modern Juche it seems that North Korea is “playing games” 
with the west, appearing progressive and implicitly pro-American.42  
In summation, Juche today seems to be tantamount to a lie that grows 
larger the more it stays hidden. Kim Jong Il and the Korean Workers’ Party are 
telling the lie of a socialist utopia to the North Koreans. And the longer it stays 
                                                
42 Among the pieces played in Pyongyang at the concert was “An American in Paris” (Wakin.)  
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that way the more credibility the Party will lose when the insurmountable force of 
globalization infiltrates North Korea. Further, the strength of the grip of Juche 
and the Korean Worker’s Party on North Koreans in general seems to be 
insurmountable using mere information penetration. Radio Free Asia and others, 
while worthwhile, are not sufficient alone. As mentioned in the introduction, real 
change must come from within, but the catalyst to that change may very well be 
via creative and persuasive communication with North Koreans.  
Future Research and Limitations of Current Research 
  Through FTA this thesis has uncovered a new understanding of Juche as a 
power-wielding tool that employs a rhetorical vision to maintain power in a 
nation bereft of a stable economy or human rights freedoms. The implications of 
the conclusions are far reaching and applicable to all aspects of North Korean life. 
Further, research based on discoveries found in this research is far reaching. Of 
course, a more thorough study of additional speeches, in addition to the two 
speeches analyzed here, would lend more clarity and legitimacy to the claims and 
conclusions of this thesis. Valuable supplementary research could be done 
through a qualitative study of refugees’ narratives of North Korea in which the 
emerging narratives could be analyzed to further understand the Juche idea, 
which in spite of the reach of this thesis still remains tremendously opaque to the 
world, at large, beyond the DPRK. Several additional “texts” were also discovered 
in the research for this project, including no less than three North Korean state-
sponsored web sites: the official website of the DPRK, the Korea Central News 
Agency website, and a website, Uriminzokkiri, with several North Korean 
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produced documentaries and North Korean propaganda. This would be 
interesting and pertinent to study as they show how North Korea postures itself 
to the outside world. Finally, an issue dealt very narrowly in this topic is the de 
facto deification of, first, Kim Il Sung and then Kim Jong Il. Additional research, 
perhaps similar to that done in this thesis, could trace the historical process of 
military leader to president to deity through an analysis of verbal and visual 
evidence.  
Finally, due to the limited nature of information on life in North Korea an 
exact tally of the scope of real devotion to this lifestyle rhetorical vision is difficult 
to know. However, based on my research it seems evident that Plato’s allegory of 
the cave can be adapted to understanding the total efficacy of the Juche lifestyle 
rhetorical vision. Simply put, due to information control and authoritarian 
oppression of independent thought has resulted in a situation where most North 
Koreans know nothing else but what they have been taught from childhood, and 
that is that Kim Jong Il and Kim Il Sung are, as described on the DPRK official 
web presence, “the sun of the nation and of mankind.” 
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